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RECONSIDERING THE NATIONAL MARKET
IN SOLID WASTE: TRADE-OFFS IN EQUITY,
EFFICIENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION, AND STATE AUTONOMY
KIRSTEN ENGELt

In this Article, ProfessorEngel examines the currentnational
market in solid waste First,"pointingto empirical data, she
notes the uneven distribution of solid 'waste among states
which resulted from this national market and points to
specific demographic, geographic and environmental
differences between net waste importing and net waste
exporting states. Second, she notes how the United States
Supreme Court has helped create this national market by
striking down state barriersto out-of-state solid waste. Third,
she argues that although the states cannot erect barriers to
out-of-state waste Congress can enable them to do so under
its Commerce Clausepowers. Based on this recognition,she
examines policy alternativesin light of four values: economic
efficiency, protection of human health and the environment,
state autonomy, and equity. Finally, balancing these four
values, Professor Engel proposes that Congress pass
legislation modeled on the Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Policy Act. This legislation would enable states to enter
interstate compacts, which would be responsible for the
disposal of solid waste within a multi-state allianceand would
have the authority to exclude waste generated outside the
alliance. More importantly, the legislation would ease many
of the problems and preserve many of the benefits created by
the current nationalmarket in solid waste.
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INTRODUCION

To the dismay of many state and local governments struggling to
dispose of the truckloads of garbage shipped in from outside their
borders, the landmark case of Philadelphiav. New Jersey' is enjoying
a revival. In its last four terms, the United States Supreme Court
affirmed that case's holding by sustaining four dormant commerce
clause2 challenges to state or local laws regulating interstate commerce in waste.3 Although persuasive arguments can be made that
the holdings in these recent cases were improper,4 the Court has

1. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
2. Although the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution is an affirmative grant
to Congress "[t]o regulate Commerce... among the several States," U.S. CONsT. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 3, the Court long ago asserted that this same power prohibits states from unduly
burdening interstate commerce even in the absence of congressional action. Cooley v.
Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1852); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat) 1, 211 (1824).
3. C & A Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown, 114 S. Ct. 1677, 1684 (1994); Oregon
Waste Sys. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 114 S. Ct. 1345,1354-55 (1994); Fort Gratiot
Landfill v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 112 S. Ct. 2019,2023-24 (1992); Chemical
Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct. 2009, 2012-13 (1992).
4. Under an exceedingly generous interpretation, the Court's role under the dormant
commerce clause can be justified as necessary to prevent states from engaging in economic
protectionism or imposing costs upon unrepresented out-of-state interests. See Julian N.
Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.. 425, 437-43 (1982)
(stating that the Court's role is to prevent state legislatures from imposing burdens upon
unrepresented out-of-state interests); Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State
Protectionism: Making Sense of the DormantCommerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1091,
1092 (1986) (stating that the Court's role is to prevent purposeful protectionism); Mark
Tushnet, Rethinking the DormantCommerce Clause, 1979 WIS. L. REv. 125, 131 (stating
that the Court's role is to prevent state legislatures from imposing burdens upon
unrepresented out-of-state interests). However, where a state is restricting the national
market in order to become more self-sufficient in the disposal of its own waste or to shield
itself from becoming a national repository for other states' garbage, as several of the states
arguably were in the recent cases before the Court, neither of these justifications for
judicial review would seem applicable. Although the judicial role has also been justified
as necessary to enforce the value of free trade, a role that would justify judicial review in
the recent waste cases, see, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974
Term-Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. RuV. 1, 17 (1974), the
"Court's application of the "per se rule of invalidity" to strike down the facially
discriminatory state laws at issue in the recent cases goes beyond the weak "undue
burden" test established by the Court to enforce the free trade interest in Pike v. Bruce
Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
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given no sign that it might be willing to soften its tough stance against
state market barriers.
Nevertheless, the Court's determination that the Constitution
requires a national free market in solid waste disposal' does not bind
Congress. Congress could exercise its affirmative power under the
Commerce Clause to authorize the very state regulations struck down
by the Court as violative of the dormant commerce clause,6 and the
Court would be obliged to uphold such an authorization.7 Yet while
Congress has mandated state or regional self-sufficiency in the
disposal of radioactive waste' and has strongly encouraged it with
respect to hazardous waste,9 it has enacted no comparable legislation
for solid waste.
An analysis of recent data presented for the first time in this
Article suggests Congress should promptly address this issue. This
analysis points to inequities in the distribution of solid waste between
states. 0 For example, data on the current distribution of solid waste
show that waste flows from the more urbanized to the more rural
states, and that the rural receiving states have lower per capita income
averages and higher amounts of air pollution than waste-exporting
states. Consequently, the distribution of solid waste through a
national market exhibits, on the state level, similarities to the
distribution of hazardous waste disposal facilities on the community
level.1 In both cases, waste is distributed more often in areas with

5. Cf. Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 265
(1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (questioning the constitutional legitimacy of the nontextual
dormant commerce clause); Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant
Commerce Clause and the ConstitutionalBalanceof Federalism,1987 DUKE L.J.569, 58285 (same).
6. See Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors, 472 U.S. 159, 174 (1985);
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 430-31 (1946); see also infra text
accompanying notes 98-102.
7. See, e.g., C & A Carbone, 114 S. Ct. at 1692 (O'Connor, J.concurring).
8. See Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Act Amendments of 1985, Pub. L. No.
99-240,99 Stat. 1842 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); see also infra
notes 265-83 and accompanying text.
9. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986,42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(9)

(1988).
10. See infra notes 56-66 and accompanying text; see also Appendix, Table 1.
11. Recent studies demonstrate that hazardous waste and other environmentally
noxious facilities are disproportionately located in communities in which the residents are

poor and belong to a racial minority. See U.S.

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SITING
OF HAZARDOUS WASTE LANDFILLS AND THEIR CORRELATION WITH RACIAL AND
ECONOMIC STATUS OF SURROUNDING COMMUNITIES 1-2 (1983); COMMISSION FOR
RACIAL JUSTICE, UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, Toxic WASTE AND RACE IN THE UNITED
STATES 13 (1987); ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY WORKGROUP, U.S. ENvTL. PROTECTION
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relatively poorer populations-areas that already are disproportionately saddled with other pollution burdens.'2
This Article attempts to shape the parameters of future
deliberations concerning the wisdom of congressional authorization of
state barriers to interstate commerce in municipal solid waste.
Preferring efficiency, free trade advocates would resist congressional
abandonment of the national market in waste currently enforced by
the courts. 3 Consideration of the interstate waste trade in the
legislative arena, however, opens up the possibility of promoting
values other than free trade and with which free trade arguably
conflicts. Consequently, even if the distribution of solid waste is
economically more efficient under a national market, lawmakers may
still prefer the imposition of state barriers on the national market if
they find such barriers promote other, higher-ranked values. 4 For
example, the European Court of Justice recently upheld, on environmental grounds, a Belgian ban on the importation of solid waste from
other European Community nations."5 Prior to authorizing similar

AGENCY, EPA 230-R-92-008, ENVIRONMENTAL EQurry: REDUCING RISK FOR ALL COMMUNITEs 11-16 (1992).

12. In contrast to the findings made by the environmental justice movement
concerning the siting of hazardous waste disposal facilities, the interstate transport of waste
tends to flow from states with high minority populations to states with low minority
populations. See infra text accompanying notes 61-62 and Appendix, Table 1. The
academic literature spawned by the environmental justice movement tends to downplay
race as the determining factor in the location of environmentally noxious facilities,
however, and instead emphasizes the socioeconomic factors that drive the siting of such
facilities in poor neighborhoods that are, or will become, populated by racial minorities.
See ROBERT D. BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE: RACE, CLASS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL

QUALrypassim (1990); Vicki Been, Locally UndesirableLand Uses in Minority Neighborhoods: DisproportionateSiting or Market Dynamics?, 103 YALE L.J. 1383, 1385 (1994);
Luke W. Cole, Empowerment as the Key to Environmental Protection: The Need for
Environmental Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619, 633-34 (1992); Richard J. Lazarus,
Pursuing"EnvironmentalJustice": The DistributionalEffects Of EnvironmentalProtection,
87 NW. U. L. REv. 787, 796 (1993); A. Dan Tarlock, Environmental Protection: The
PotentialMisfit Between Equity andEfficiency, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 871, 872 (1992). This
characterization is more consistent with the interstate distribution of solid waste.
13. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, InternationalTrade and Environment: Lessons From
the FederalExperience, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV.1329, 1338 (1991) ("Free trade in wastes
should promote joint welfare for reasons similar to those that justify free trade in ordinary
goods and services.").
14. See JOE B. STEVENS, THE ECONOMICS OF COLLECTIVE CHOICE 42 (1993) ("[T]he
simplest answer to why Pareto efficiency isn't necessarily 'good' is that society may care,
and indeed care greatly, about who benefits-and conversely, who does not benefit-when
a good or service is produced and consumed.").
15. Case C-2/90, Commission v. Belgium, 1 C.M.L.R. 365,397 (1993) ("The principle
that environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at source-a principle laid
down by Article 130r(2) EEC for action by the Community relating to the environ-
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action by states within the United States, however, Congress and the
public must understand the social values relevant to the manner in
which solid waste is distributed and how different schemes for
distributing waste either promote or hinder these values. Thus, the
primary purpose of this Article is to provide such an understanding
and thereby fill an existing gap in the current dialogue over congressional modification of the national solid waste market. A secondary
purpose of this Article is to go a step beyond an analysis of the
distributive schemes currently dominating the legislative agenda and
to propose an alternative framework that allows Congress to balance
the competing values implicated in any decision to regulate or not to
regulate interstate commerce in solid waste.
A congressional decision to retain or alter the national market
implicates four primary values: economic efficiency, protection of
human health and the environment, state autonomy, and equity.
Because none of the values is subject to a single definition or
characterized by a single approach, it is necessary to break each down
further and to analyze how the mechanism for distributing waste
affects each. As this Article will show, the interpretation given to
each criterion will affect whether it will be furthered by a given option
for distributing waste. This Article concludes that considerable tradeoffs accompany either a choice to retain the national market or to
modify the market through the authorization of state import or export
barriers.
While both policy options entail significant concessions, Congress
is not limited to these two distributive schemes. Congress could
instead adopt a compromise position that authorizes states to enter
regional interstate compacts for the disposal of solid waste and
thereby avoid the extreme trade-offs inherent in either the national
market or state barrier approach. Congress used regional interstate
compacts to solve the bitter interstate bickering over the distribution
of the disposal of low-level radioactive waste, 6 and the same
approach would be effective in addressing the similar problems
dominating the disposal of solid waste. Moreover, the regional
interstate compact approach satisfies, at least to some degree, each of
the values represented by the relevant criteria. Disposal of solid
waste on a regional basis would preserve greater efficiency in the
disposal of waste and, accordingly, market-facilitated approaches to
ment-means that it is for each region, commune or other local entity to take appropriate
measures to receive, process and dispose of its own waste.").
16. See infra text accompanying notes 265-84.

1995]

NATIONAL MARKET IN SOLID WASTE

1487

environmental protection, than would state waste import barriers. In
addition, the regional approach would reduce the interstate inequities
that result when some states are unfairly forced to shoulder fiscal and
health burdens disproportionate to the volumes of solid waste they
generate. For the same reasons that the regional compact approach
furthers the value of equity, it also furthers the values inherent in
state autonomy and the traditional and ethical approaches to
environmental protection.
Part II of the Article discusses why solid waste is shipped for
disposal in interstate commerce and why and how states are currently
attempting to regulate or tax the disposal of out-of-state waste within
their borders.
Part III examines the four criteria by which the
option to retain or change the status quo of solid waste distribution
should be evaluated."
Part IV applies these four criteria to four
options for congressional action: Do nothing; authorize state waste
import bans; authorize compensatory or unlimited discriminatory
surcharges upon out-of-state waste; or authorize flow control laws.
Part IV also discusses the trade-offs involved in adopting any one of
the four options.' Part V proposes a compromise solution, namely,
Congress's authorization of regional interstate compacts with the
authority to exclude waste generated in nonmember states.20 Finally,
the appendix compares various demographic, geographic, and
economic statistics of net solid waste-importing and waste-exporting
states and their state trading partners.2 ' The appendix also portrays
the trade-offs that result from congressional adoption of any of the
options for the distribution of waste discussed in this Article.'
II. BACKGROUND
A. The What, Where, and Why of InterstateCommerce in Solid Waste
The generation of solid waste in the United States has increased
steadily and shows no sign of abating. The 87.8 million tons
generated in 1960 increased to 195.7 million tons in 1990 and is

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

See infra notes 23-97 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 98-251 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 252-263 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 264-297 and accompanying text.
See infra Appendix, Tables 1, 2, and 3.
See infra Appendix, Table 4.
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expected to reach a total of 222 million tons by the year 2000.'
Municipal solid waste consists of ordinary household garbage;
commercial solid wastes from restaurants, motels, stores, schools,
hospitals, and other businesses; and nonhazardous industrial wastes.24
Despite its innocuous label, municipal solid waste often contains toxic
materials. For instance, many household products-such as household
cleaners, automotive products, paint thinners, and pesticides-contain
toxic constituents that would force their regulation as hazardous
wastes were they generated by industry z
Some of the most
common products found in municipal solid waste are also the most
hazardous: Appliance batteries, fluorescent light bulbs, and thermometers contain mercury; steel-can solder and car batteries contain
lead.26

Most municipal solid wastes are disposed of in landfills, though
increasingly larger portions are recycled or incinerated.
Groundwater contamination from toxic "leachate," the rainwater that
seeps through landfillsm presents the primary environmental threat
from solid waste landfills. Federal environmental regulations now

23. OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA/530-R-92-019,
1992

CHARACrERIZATION OF MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE IN THE UNITED STATES:
UPDATE ES-3 (July 1992).

24. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 60.51a, 257.2 (1993).
25. Solid Waste Disposal Facility Criteria, 53 Fed. Reg. 33,314, 33,318 (1988) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 257,258). Under federal law, municipal solid wastes are a subset
of the universe of solid wastes regulated under Subtitle D of the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6941-6949a (1988). Subtitle C of RCRA, 42
U.S.C. §§ 6921-6939b (1988), defines and regulates hazardous wastes that consist of
specifically listed wastes or wastes that exhibit the characteristics of flammability, corrosiveness, reactivity, or toxicity. 42 U.S.C. § 6921 (1988); 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.20-261.24
(1993). Only hazardous wastes generated by commercial industry in amounts greater than
100 kilograms per month are subject to the extremely stringent Subtitle C "cradle to
grave" treatment, storage, and disposal regulations. 42 U.S.C. § 6921(d) (1988); 40 C.F.R.
§ 261 (1993).
26. S. REP. No. 301, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. at 4-5 (1992). Both mercury and lead are
contaminants that, if present in sufficiently high concentrations, render a waste hazardous
under EPA regulations. See 40 C.F.R. § 261.24 (1993).
27. In 1990, 66.6% of all municipal solid waste was disposed of in landfills, while
15.2% was disposed of in incinerators that produced energy as a byproduct (also known
as "energy recovery facilities") and 14.9% was recycled. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECrION
AGENCY, supra note 23, at 3-2 (Table 24).
28. While the leachate from municipal solid waste disposal facilities is less toxic than
that from hazardous waste disposal facilities, the threat of contamination is still significant
because the volume produced is so much greater. ROBERT V. PERCIVAL Er AL.,
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 203-04 (1992).
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govern municipal solid waste landfills,29 although a history of neglect

has resulted in twenty percent of the nation's most toxic Superfund
sites being former municipal landfills." Nevertheless, despite the
many hazardous products that are disposed of in municipal landfills,

these regulations are significantly less stringent than those applicable
to hazardous waste landfills.31

The primary environmental threat

from incinerators is toxic air pollutants.32 Air pollution regulations
govern municipal incinerators, and the toxic ash they generate is now

regulated as a hazardous waste.33 In addition to the ever-present
environmental risks, the noise and truck traffic that accompany
disposal operations render municipal waste disposal facilities akin to
public nuisances.

29. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 257-258 (1993). Prior to federal regulation, solid waste landfills
were subject to state regulation. However, the quality and comprehensiveness of state
regulation varied widely. See Solid Waste Disposal Facility Criteria, 56 Fed. Reg. 50,928,
50,993-50,994 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 257, 258).
30. Twenty-two percent of the 850 sites on the Superfund National Priorities List in
1986 were formerly municipal solid waste landfills. Solid Waste Disposal Facility Criteria,
53 Fed. Reg. 33,314, 33,319 (1988) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 257-58). According to
an EPA survey reported in 1988, more than 25% of those landfills with ground-water
monitoring systems were reported to be in violation of state environmental regulations.
Id.
31. Solid Waste Disposal Facility Criteria, 53 Fed. Reg. 33,318 (1988) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. pts. 257, 258). EPA regulations establish standards for the siting, design,
operation, closure, and financial assurance of municipal landfills. A few of the items on
which the municipal standards are less stringent than the hazardous waste landfills are the
presence of an exemption for small landfills (receiving less than 20 tons per day and
located in low rainfall areas), the option of placing ground-water monitoring receptors up
to 150 feet from a landfill (thus allowing 150 feet of ground-water contamination), and the
"grandfathering" of the poor design and location aspects of existing facilities. Perhaps
most importantly, several of the municipal regulations are self-implementing, or effective
without regulatory oversight. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 258.1-258.7 (providing for self-implementation of design, ground-water monitoring, and other criteria in states lacking federal
approval); Solid Waste Disposal Facility Criteria, 56 Fed. Reg. 50,978,50,993-94 (1991) (to
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 257,258) (explaining self-implementing requirements); see also
Kirsten Engel, EnvironmentalStandardsasRegulatory Common Law: Toward Consistency
in Solid Waste Regulation, 21 N.M. L. REV. 13, 13 n.5 (1990) (noting that the selfimplementing nature of EPA's municipal solid waste landfill regulations make them less
stringent than the agency's hazardous waste regulations).
32. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 60.50a-60.59a (1993) (stating standards of performance for air
emissions from municipal waste combustors).
33. City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 114 S. Ct. 1588, 1591 (1994)
(holding that ash generated by waste-to-energy facilities must be disposed of at permitted
hazardous waste disposal facilities if found sufficiently toxic under EPA's hazardous waste
toxicity characteristic).
34. See, e.g., Margaret A. Walls & Barbara L. Marcus, Should CongressAllow States
to Restrict Waste Imports?, RESOURCES, Winter 1993, at 7.
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According to recent estimates, states presently export an
estimated 15 million tons of municipal solid waste for disposal in
other states. Between 1990 and 1992, interstate shipment of waste
grew by 4 million tons-an increase of twenty-five percent.35 Although all states except Hawaii engage in interstate commerce in
waste, approximately half of the states are either net waste exporters
or net waste importers.36 The exports and imports of the remaining
states cancel each other out so that they are neither net waste
importers nor net waste exporters. The largest waste exporters are
New York and New Jersey. In 1992, the net exports of these two
states exceeded 6 million tons, or thirty-four percent of the total
quantity of waste that travels in interstate commerce.37 In the same
year, the net imports of solid waste by Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana,
Illinois, and Virginia each exceeded one million tons.3"
Waste moves in interstate commerce for several reasons. The
first reason is cost. The nation's largest waste-exporting states spend
far less disposing of waste out-of-state than they would disposing of
the waste in-state. 39 Because the technological costs of waste
disposal are relatively fixed, lower tipping fees4' in out-of-state
disposal facilities are mostly attributable to external factors such as
real estate values 4' and the facility's environmental controls.42 Lax
35. Id. Thus, although the amount of solid waste exported is still a fraction of the
total amount of waste generated-approximately 13%-the amount is rapidly increasing.
36. According to a recent report, 16 states are net municipal solid waste importers, 12
states (including the District of Columbia) are net exporters, and 23 states are neither net
importers nor net exporters. Edward Repa, Interstate Movement of Solid Waste-1992
Update, WASTE AGE MAGAZINE, Special Report 1993, tbl. ("State Imports and Exports
of Municipal Solid Waste (1992)").
37. Id. This figure excludes the amount of waste both states ship to Ontario, Canada.
38. Id.
39. JAMES E. MCCARTHY, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, CRS ISSUE BRIEF:
SOLID WASTE: RCRA REAUTHORIZATION ISSUES IN THE 103D CONGRESS 8 (Updated
July 7, 1993) (stating that disposal costs range from $11 to $12 per ton in parts of the
Midwest and Southwest, to more than $100 a ton in the Northeast, and that waste can be
transported long distances for as little as $50 per ton); Walls & Marcus, supra note 34, at
7 (observing that even with transportation costs, it remains cheaper for New Yorkers to
dispose of solid waste in Indiana, where the tipping fee is around $21 per ton, as opposed
to $150 per ton at New York's Fresh Kills landfill).
40. Tipping fees are the fees charged for the disposal of waste by owners and
operators of municipal waste incinerators and landfills. See, e.g., C & A Carbone v. Town
of Clarkstown, 114 S. Ct. 1677, 1680 (1994).
41. "In midwestern states, the greater availability and lower cost of land" significantly
lower the costs of landfill use. Walls & Marcus, supra note 34, at 7.
42. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 301,102d Cong., 2d Sess. 74 (1992) ("One of the reasons that
long distance waste transport is economical is because many importing landfills currently
operate without controls-unlined and without groundwater monitors-which keeps their
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environmental controls are particularly important: According to a

congressional report, if landfills that currently accept out-of-state
waste were replaced by facilities with state-of-the-art environmental

controls, the tipping costs would increase five times or more.43
Second, waste may be transported for disposal in interstate
commerce because of a lack of available landfill space in the state in
which it is generated. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
estimates that of the 6,000 municipal landfills operating in 1986,

seventy-five percent will be closed by the year 2002. 4

These

landfills will close either because they have reached capacity 45 or

because they are unable to meet more stringent environmental
standards. 4 Only a small percentage of the landfills that close will
be replaced.47 Failure to site new facilities is generally attributed to
the "not in my backyard," or NIMBY, syndrome.O Although often

disposal costs low."); TransportationandHazardousMaterialsMunicipalSolid Waste Flow
Control,HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Transportationand HazardousMaterials,House
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1993) (Statement of P. L.
Warner, Minnesota Pollution Control Agency) (testifying that landfills located outside
Minnesota have artificially low tipping fees because they do not provide for environmental
protection or future cleanup costs to the same extent as facilities located within the state).
43. S.REP. No. 301, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 74 (1992).
44. InterstateTransport of Solid Waste: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Transportation and HazardousMaterials of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. 80 (1991) [hereinafter Interstate Transportationof Solid Waste] (Statement of Don
R. Clay, Assistant Administrator for Solid Waste and Emergency Response, U.S. EPA);
see also S. REP. No. 301, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1992) ("[O]ver 80 percent of the landfills
that were operating in 1988 will close in the next 20 years."). But see Jeff Bailey, Waste
of a Sort; Curbside Recycling Comforts the Soul, But Benefits are Scant; Myths Help Fuel
ProgramsThat Turn Out to Cost More Than They Deliver; Legacy of the GarbageBarge,
WALL ST. J. Jan. 19, 1995, at Al, A8 (pointing to EPA research that suggests policy
makers have overstated the so-called "landfill crisis").
45. See, e.g., 56 Fed. Reg. 50,978, 50,980 (1991) (indicating that 45% of solid waste
landfills were expected to have reached capacity by 1991).
46. See Linda E. Christensen & Sean Murphy, The Futureof Landfills, 27 MD. BAR
J. 8, 10 (1994).
47. Margaret A. Walls & David Edelstein, Dirty Words: Regional Conflicts in the
Interstate Transportof Municipal Solid Waste 11 (1992) (manuscript on file with author)
(stating that between 1986 and 1991, 130 landfills in New York closed while only 18 were
opened or expanded; over that same period, 22 landfills were closed in Indiana and 15 new
ones were opened).
48. See NATIONAL SOLID WASTES MANAGEMENT ASS'N, SPECIAL REPORT:
INTERSTATE MOVEMENT OF MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE 2 (Feb. 1992) (stating that
NIMBYism is one major reason some areas have inadequate disposal capacity);
MCCARTHY, supra note 39, at 8 (explaining methods by which states with adequate
disposal capacity are trying to prevent others from using it); Edward Walsh et al.,
Backyards, NIMBYs, and IncineratorSitings: Implicationsfor Social Movement Theory,
40 SoC. PROB. 25, 27 (1993). Due to required engineering aspects of all landfills, the
failure to site new facilities has little to do with geographic location. See, e.g., 56 Fed. Reg.
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derided, the NIMBY syndrome is in fact a complex phenomenon.
While some studies claim that NIMBY is motivated by selfishness and0
fear,4 9 others contend that it is'driven by considerations of equity
or genuine concerns over risks to community health ignored by the
political process." Whatever the cause, those who block the siting
of new facilities will eventually "free ride" off of the landfill space
remaining in other states.'
Finally, waste may be shipped in interstate commerce simply for
convenience. An out-of-state facility is often located closer to the
waste generation site than an in-state facility.5 3 Because several

major metropolitan areas are located on borders, movement of waste
out-of-state may simply be the most convenient option for the
residents of those areas. 4 Recently, there has been a trend toward

51,009 (1991) (required landfill liner "designed to be protective in all locations, including
poor locations"). Although the new municipal solid waste landfill regulations contain
location restrictions, they are minimal. Landfills must meet specific requirements to be
located near airports, floodplains, wetlands, and unstable areas. See 40 C.F.R. § 258.10-.15
(1993).
49. Scholars are sharply divided over whether the NIMBY syndrome constitutes social
irresponsibility or reasonable concern for genuine risks to community health and welfare.
Several condemn the NIMBY syndrome as selfish and costly to society, even if it is a
rational response to feelings of community powerlessness. See DAVID MORELL &
CHRISTOPHER MAGORIAN, SITING HAZARDOUS WASTE FACILITIES: LOCAL OPPOSITION

AND THE MYTH OF PREEMPTION

7

(1982); CHARLES PILLER, THE FAIL-SAFE SOCIETY:

16-36
(1991); Orlando E. Delogu, "NIMBY" is a National Environmental Problem, 35 S.D. L.
REv. 198, 207-08 (1990).
50. See Robert D. Benford et al., In Whose Backyard?: Concern About Siting a
Nuclear Waste Facility, 63 Soc. INQUIRY 30, 44 (1993) (arguing that strength of individual
opposition to a proposed facility siting depends upon the amount of personal benefits the
individual stands to gain); Denis J. Brion, An Essay on LULU, NIMBY, and the Problem
of DistributiveJustice, 15 ENV'T AFF. 437, 471-78 (1988) (explaining the nature of a
neighbor's land in elements and measure of value).
51. See Daniel J. Fiorino, Environmental Risk and Democratic Process: A Critical
Review, 14 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 501, 517 (1989); see also Michael E. Kraft & Bruce B.
Clary, Citizen Participationand the NIMBY Syndrome: Public Response to Radioactive
Waste Disposal,44 W. POL. Q. 299, 324 (1991) (proposing that government share further
information regarding the risks of nuclear waste and local repository sitings to encourage
public participation in citing decisions).
52. Walls & Edelstein, supra note 47, at 10-11 (stating that because administrative,
legal, time, and public hearing costs are sustained by the host community, shipping waste
for disposal to other states or other communities successfully results in avoiding these
COMMUNITY DEFIANCE AND THE END OF AMERICAN TECHNOLOGICAL OPTIMISM

costs).
53. S. Rep. 301, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 73-74 (1992).
54. A few of the cities that utilize out-of-state facilities in part for this reason are New
York, Philadelphia, Washington, Chicago, St. Louis, Kansas City, and El Paso.
Memorandum from James E. McCarthy et al., Environmental and Natural Resources
Policy Division, to Senate Env't. and Public Works Comm. 2 (July 12, 1990) (on file with
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the regionalization of waste disposal that may lead to the use of one
state's landfill or waste-to-energy facility by residents in contiguous
states.55
B. Statistics CharacterizingNet Waste-Importingand Waste-Exporting
States

Solid waste is primarily exported from states in the northeast to
states in the midwest. 6 In addition, there is anecdotal evidence that
waste is exported from northeastern states to western states such as
New Mexico.'
Population density often distinguishes wasteexporter and waste-importer states. A statistical analysis of the top
ten net importer states and the top ten net exporter states, together
with their waste trade partner states (not including Washington,
D.C.), 58 demonstrates that, on average, waste importers have a
author).
55. NATIONAL SOLID WASTES MANAGEMENT ASS'N, supra note 48, at 2.
56. For example, five of the nation's top 10 net municipal solid waste-exporting states
are located in the northeast, while 5 of the top 10 net waste-importing states are located
in the midwest. New York and New Jersey export over a third of the municipal solid
waste that moves in interstate commerce. See infra Appendix, Table 2. The data in Table
2 was compiled from the following sources: U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1993 28-29,30-31,217,468,471

(13th ed. 1993) (giving the following information by state: population per square mile,
land area, total resident population, resident population by race, income per capita,
percent of resident population below the poverty level); U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY, CHARACTERIZATION OF MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE IN THE UNITED STATES:

1992 UPDATE 5 (1992) (estimating that the average amount of municipal solid waste
generated daily per person in the United States was 4.3 lbs. in 1990); U.S. ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY, 1991 Toxic RELEASE INVENTORY (1991) (listing total amount of
releases of toxic chemicals to air and water by state); Repa, supra note 36 (describing net
imports and exports of municipal solid waste in millions of tons per year by state).
57. Elizabeth Hudson, Proposed Landfill Incenses New Mexico Town: Residents Fear
East Coast Garbage Will Bury Serenity and SpectacularScenery, WASH. POST, May 31,
1989, at A3 (identifying a small New Mexico town as the proposed site of the nation's
largest landfill receiving waste from East Coast cities); see also Interstate Transportation
of Solid Waste, supra note 44, at 299 (1991) (statement of Allen Hershkowitz, Senior
Scientist at Natural Resources Defense Council) ("New Mexico and other southwestern
states seem particularly vulnerable to unprecedented mega-landfill schemes .... ."); id. at
18 (statement of Hon. Dave McCurdy, Congressman from Oklahoma) (asserting that
Oklahoma is a target of proposals to build large landfills for the purpose of importing outof-state waste).
58. There are a total of 16 net importing and 12 net exporting states. Because the
amounts of waste imported and exported from the net importing and exporting states
below the top 10 were small, the comparison of importers to exporters was limited to only
the top 10 net importers and net exporters. The top 10 net importing states and the
amount of waste they imported in 1992 in millions of tons are: Pennsylvania (3.3); Illinois
(1.8); Ohio (1.5); Indiana (1.4); Virginia (1.4); West Virginia (0.8); Oregon (0.6); Kansas
(0.5); New Hampshire (0.3); and Wisconsin (0.3). The top 10 net exporting states
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population density of 173 persons per square mile less than their
export partners.5 9 Differences in waste density after trade show a
similar trend, with waste density in importer states about 50 tons per
square mile less than in waste-exporter states.60
Waste also moves in interstate commerce from states with higher
resident per capita incomes to states with lower resident per capita
incomes. On average, the annual per capita income of residents in
waste-importer states is $1,170 less than in exporter states. 61 Poverty
levels may also be slightly greater in waste-importer states relative to
exporters, but the difference is not statistically significant.62 Interestingly, given the more rural nature of waste-importing states, waste
importers also appear to suffer greater environmental burdens in
other forms as well, at least in terms of the amount of air pollution
and possibly the amount of water pollution.'
Finally, in contrast to what might be expected from the conventional wisdom on environmental inequities, 6' this analysis does not
provide any evidence that racial minorities endure a greater solid
waste burden, at least when statistics are aggregated at the state level.

(including the District of Columbia) and the amount of waste they exported during 1992
in millions of tons are: New York (3.7); New Jersey (2.6); Missouri (1.1); Washington
(0.6); District of Columbia (0.6); Rhode Island (0.5); Texas (0.1); Michigan (0.1);
Massachusetts (0.1); and Idaho (0.1). The table showing 114 state-to-state pairs of
importer and exporter states constitutes a comparison between each of the 10 net importer
and the 10 net exporter states and each of its importer or exporter state partners. With
a few exceptions, the partner state was itself a net importing or net exporting state. See
infra Appendix, Table 2.
59. See infra Appendix, Table 1. Data shown on Table 1 were compiled from the data
shown on Tables 2 and 3.
60. See infra Appendix, Table 1. This statistic is based upon the admittedly unrealistic
assumption that the waste disposed of in a state is distributed evenly across the entire land
mass. The distribution of waste is, of course, concentrated in discrete disposal facilities
which are themselves distributed in an unequal fashion across the landscape. Nevertheless,
considering that there are no data available on the actual distribution of waste disposal
facilities, this statistic, together with the statistic on average population density, provides
the closest indication we have that waste flows in interstate commerce from smaller, more
densely populated states to larger, more sparsely populated states.
61. See infra Appendix, Table 1.
62. See infra Appendix, Table 1.
63. See infra Appendix, Table 1. The difference in water pollution was not quite
statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. The source of this data is the Toxic
Release Inventory (TRI), a database administered by the Environmental Protection
Agency and mandated by the Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act,
42 U.S.C. § 11001-11050 (1988). TRI data shows total releases of toxic chemicals to
environmental media-including air, water, and soil-by state. 42 U.S.C. § 11023(g)

(1988).
64. See supra note 11.
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In fact, waste-importer states had a significantly lower percentage of
minorities than waste exporters (about three percentage points
less).'
These findings show that municipal solid waste transported in
interstate commerce seeks the path of least resistance, flowing toward
more rural states where the resident income levels are comparatively
lower than the state in which the waste originated and where the
resident population is already burdened with comparatively higher
levels of air pollution. These nationwide findings are similar to the
statewide findings made with respect to the placement of solid and
hazardous waste landfills, except as to the role concentrations of racial
minorities play in placement. Studies show that these facilities are
disproportionately located in poorer and more rural neighborhoods.'
C. The Fate of State Barriersto Interstate Commerce in Waste Under
the Dormant Commerce Clause
1. The Impact of Philadelphiav. New Jersey
Since 1978, the fate of state barriers to interstate commerce in
waste has been governed by the Court's pronouncements in Philadelphia v. New Jersey.67 Prior to 1978, state regulation of interstate
commerce in articles noxious to human health (disease-infested rags,
livestock, and alcoholic beverages) was considered immune to
Commerce Clause scrutiny under the so-called "quarantine
exemption."' In Philadelphiav. New Jersey, the Court distinguished
garbage from such articles on the basis that, unlike the solid waste
banned from New Jersey's landfills, the articles at issue in the
quarantine cases endangered human health through their very
movement, intrastate as well as interstate.

9

The Court's about-face

seems to have been based not on this dubious distinction,70 but on
65. See infra Appendix, Table 1.
66. See supra note 12.

67. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
68. See, e.g., Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U.S. 251 (1908) (diseased livestock); Reid v.
Colorado, 187 U.S. 137 (1902) (diseased livestock); Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern
Ry. Co., 125 U.S. 465 (1888) (alcoholic beverages).
69. Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 628-29.
70. The Court's distinction in Philadelphiabetween solid waste, which it held to be
subject to the dormant commerce clause, and the noxious items at issue in the quarantine
cases, which it held exempt from the dormant commerce clause, is as questionable now as

it was then. New Jersey's law applied to "putrescible materials," which are certainly as
noxious as the alcoholic beverages successfully banned from interstate commerce under
the quarantine exception. Id. at 619 n.2. Since Philadelphia,the Court has extended the
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the view that a national market in waste disposal options was
necessary to address the problem, shared by all states, of the
dwindling supply of landfill space. According to the Court, only by
assuring the availability of a national market for unused space could
any state be secure, now or in the future, from the hazards associated
with a lack of safe disposal options.7'
Juxtaposed against these insurance-like advantages of the
national market in waste disposal, however, are the distinct advantages of state regulatory barriers to interstate commerce in solid
waste. Prior to the Supreme Court's dormant commerce clause waste
decisions, states implemented three types of barriers to interstate
commerce:
import bans on out-of-state waste, discriminatory
surcharges on out-of-state waste, and flow control laws.' Each type
of regulation was designed to give a locality greater control over
waste management, by reducing the volume of waste imported from
outside the state, by requiring compensation for disposal costs
attributable to out-of-state wastes, or by channeling waste generated
in-state to locally designated disposal facilities.
Nevertheless, because the Court found that these laws incorporate a facial discrimination against interstate commerce, they each
fell victim to the Court's strict scrutiny test. Under this test, facially
discriminatory laws are "virtually per se" invalid. 3 States may rebut
this presumption only by demonstrating the absence of a non-

dormant commerce clause to state regulation of hazardous waste, thus eliminating any
viable distinction between the articles once subject to the quarantine exception and those
now subject to the dormant commerce clause. See Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v.

Hunt, 112 S. Ct. 2009, 2012-13 n.3 (1992).
71. Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 629.
72. See Bruce J. Parker, Federal/State Issues Under RCRA (National Solid Waste

Management Association), Jan. 1992, at 1-14. (compiling state laws excluding, limiting, or
burdening the importation of out-of-state waste); Walls & Marcus, supra note 34, at 7-8.
73. Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 624 ("[W]here simple economic perfectionism is effected
by state legislation, a virtual per se rule of invalidity has been erected."). In contrast,
under the test announced in Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137 (1970), when the statute
is found to be neutral on its face, the law will be upheld unless it imposes an undue burden
upon interstate commerce that is "clearly excessive" in relation to its local benefits. Id.
at 142. The determination that statutes which facially discriminate should be distinguished
for Commerce Clause purposes from statutes which are facially neutral originated in
Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275, 282-83 (1875) (invalidating a regulation requiring only
out-of-state salesmen to obtain a license to sell goods in Missouri). See Vincent Blasi,
ConstitutionalLimitations on the Powers of States to Regulate the Movement of Goods in
InterstateCommerce, in COURTS AND FREE MARKETS 174,180 (Terrance Sandalow & Eric
Stein eds., 1982) ("The anti-discrimination principle.., has been the one constant element
in all of the doctrinal reformulations that have been undertaken since [Welton].").
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discriminatory alternative to attain the state's objective.7 4 As with
most facially discriminatory laws,75 states have had trouble
demonstrating a lack of alternatives to facial discrimination against
interstate commerce in waste.76

Thus, excepting the question

whether the Court's holdings apply to state barriers that affect only
public disposal facilities, 7 the invalidity of state barriers to interstate
commerce in waste affecting private operators is now settled.

74. Oregon Waste Sys. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 114 S. Ct. 1345,1352 (1994).
Outside the waste cases, the Court has sometimes articulated the standard slightly less
stringently. See, e.g., New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269,274 (1988) (holding that
a state law that clearly discriminates against interstate commerce is unconstitutional
"unless the discrimination is demonstrably justified by a valid factor unrelated to economic
protectionism").
75. In only one case was the state able to rebut the presumption against facially
discriminatory statutes. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 148-151 (1986) (finding that
Maine baitfish are free of diseases of baitfish captured outside the state, thus justifying
Maine's import ban upon out-of-state baitfish); Michael E. Smith, State Discrimination
Against Interstate Commerce, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1203, 1204 (1986) ("The nub of the matter
is that discriminatory regulations are almost invariably invalid, whereas nondiscriminatory
regulations are much more likely to survive.").
76. See infra notes 78-97 and accompanying text.
77. Under the market participant exception to the dormant commerce clause, benefits
created by the state through public funding are generally exempt from the dormant
commerce clause. See e.g., Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 440 (1980) (holding that
state preference for in-state cement purchasers does not violate dormant commerce clause
where state manufactures and sells the cement); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Co., 426 U.S.
794, 809-10 (1976) (holding that state auto-scrap purchasing scheme giving preference to
in-state scrap dealers does not violate dormant commerce clause where state merely
participates in the market as a purchaser). Although the Supreme Court has expressly
side-stepped the issue of whether a state can restrict to state residents access to publiclyowned landfills, see Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 627 n.6, several courts have applied the
doctrine to exempt state restrictions upon access to publicly-owned landfills by out-ofstaters, see Swin Resource Sys., Inc. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245,250 (3d Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1077 (1990); Lefrancois v. Rhode Island, 669 F. Supp. 1204, 1209
(D.R.I. 1987); Shayne Bros., Inc. v. District of Columbia, 592 F. Supp. 1128,1134 (D.D.C.
1984); County Comm'rs of Charles County v. Stevens, 473 A.2d 12, 21 (Md. App. 1984).
Banking on the validity of this exception with respect to discrimination against out-of-state
waste, Maine has announced that it "will no longer approve applications for commercial
solid waste [disposal] facilities." Catherine Wilt, Interstate-WasteBattle Rages, RECYCLING
TODAY, Sept. 1991, at 68. On the market participant doctrine generally, see Dan T.
Coenen, Untangling the Market-ParticipantExemption to the DormantCommerce Clause,
88 MICH. L. REv. 395 (1989). For the specific application of the market participant
doctrine to waste disposal, see David Pomper, Comment, Recycling Philadelphia v. New
Jersey: The DormantCommerce Clause,Postindustrial"Natural"Resources, and the Solid
Waste Crisis,137 U. PA. L. REv. 1309, 1312-28 (1989).
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2. A Compendium of Now-Illegal State Barriers
(a) Import Bans
Import bans allow a state to preserve its landfill space for its own
residents, thereby delaying the day when a new facility must be sited.
Import bans also make it easier for state officials to plan for local
disposal needs and may even reduce community resistance to the
siting of new disposal facilities. 7 The Court recently affirmed its
holding in Philadelphia v. New Jersey, though, that import bans
violate the dormant commerce clause. In Fort Gratiot Sanitary
Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources,79 Michigan
attempted to distinguish its import ban from New Jersey's by arguing
that the ban was necessary to the state's efforts to plan adequately for
the safe disposal of future waste within its counties and hence was not
enacted for the purposes of economic protectionism.8' The Court
refused to find that this state interest was sufficient to overcome the
presumption against the law based upon its facial discrimination,
holding instead that the state could achieve the same objectives
through nondiscriminatory means. For example, the state could
simply limit the total amount of waste disposed of at a given landfill
in a given year.8 '
(b) Discriminatory Surcharges
Regulations imposing discriminatory surcharges on the disposal
of out-of-state waste may either serve as a substitute for an import
ban or may merely compensate the state for any additional costs
associated with the disposal of out-of-state waste. s8 In Chemical

78. See infra notes 144-49 and accompanying text.
79. 112 S. Ct. 2019 (1992).
80. Id. at 2026.
81. Id. at 2026-27. If the state's objective was to be self-sufficient in the disposal of
its own waste, however, the Court's holding would be wrong. The option of reducing the
flow of all waste into the state's landfills, including waste generated in-state, could result
in barring the in-state disposal of some wastes generated in-state if the state's landfills had
insufficient capacity for both the waste generated in-state as well as that generated out-ofstate.
82. Yet a third type of discriminatory surcharge requires that the tipping fee charged
upon all out-of-state waste be equal to the difference between the disposal fees nearest the
point of generation and that at the place of disposal. Such a fee eliminates the economic
advantages of shipping waste to cheaper disposal facilities out-of-state. In Government
Suppliers Consolidating Serv., Inc. v. Bayh, 753 F. Supp. 739 (S.D. Ind. 1990), an Indiana
law enacting this scheme was struck down on dormant commerce clause grounds. Id. at
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Waste Management, Ina v. Hunt s the Court struck down a
discriminatory surcharge on hazardous wastes generated out-of-state,
despite Alabama's argument that it was necessary both to reduce the
volume of waste disposed of in-state and to compensate the state for
the costs of disposing of out-of-state wastes.' 4 In rejecting these
arguments, the Court held that the former did not justify
discriminating between waste generated in-state and out-of-state s
and that the state had failed to demonstrate how its discriminatory fee
constituted a compensatory tax.'
In Oregon Waste Systems v. Department of Environmental
Quality,8' a recent dormant commerce clause challenge to a
discriminatory surcharge, Oregon did attempt to correlate the higher
fees it applied to solid waste generated out-of-state to a nonresident's
fair share of the general tax revenues contributed by Oregon residents
to the disposal of waste within the state." The State argued that
without the ability to impose a discriminatory fee, its resident
taxpayers would effectively subsidize the disposal of out-of-state
waste.89 The Court summarily rejected this argument, holding that
even if the surcharge was roughly the equivalent of the in-state tax
burden, disposing of wastes and accumulating income for tax purposes
were too dissimilar to justify the state's discriminatory surcharge
under the "compensatory tax doctrine's" exception to the prohibition
upon discrimination against interstate commerce. 90
(c) Flow Control Laws
Finally, prior to its invalidation in C & A Carbone,Inc. v. Town
of Clarkstown,9' the flow control law was a popular type of state
barrier to interstate transport of waste. 2 Flow control laws are
779-80.
83. 112 S. Ct. 2009 (1992).
84. Id. at 2013-14.
85. Id. at 2014-15.
86. Id. at 2016 n.9.
87. 114 S. Ct. 1345 (1994).
88. Id. at 1351-53.
89. Id. at 1353.
90. Id. at 1353-54.
91. 114 S. Ct. 1677 (1994).
92. A year before the Court's decision in C & A Carbone,26 states expressly granted
localities or state agencies the authority to implement flow control laws. Bruce Parker,
Recent Federal Court Decisions Overturn "Flow Control" Ordinances,WASTE AGE, Apr.
1993, at 115. At the turn of the century, the Supreme Court upheld what were essentially
flow control ordinances. See Gardner v. Michigan, 199 U.S. 325, 334-35 (1905); California
Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Reduction Works, 199 U.S. 306, 325 (1905).
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essentially the opposite of import bans. Rather than keeping out
waste generated out-of-state, flow control laws keep in waste
generated in-state. Specifically, flow control laws require that all
waste generated within a locality be sent to a designated facility for
handling, recycling, treatment, or disposal.93 These laws enable cities
and towns to obtain contracts for waste disposal services by assuring
a single operator a minimum of tipping fees.94 This assurance can
also enable a locality to finance the construction of its own disposal
or recycling facility.95 In C & A Carbone, the Court held that the
flow control law at issue was facially discriminatory, despite the
locality's argument that because the law discriminated against all solid
waste recyclers other than the contractor operating the designated
facility-including other recyclers located within the town-the law
was actually facially neutral. 6 Stating that the locality's financial
objectives could be achieved through nondiscriminatory means, the
Court struck down the law as a violation of the dormant commerce
clause. 97
III. VALUES RELEVANT TO THE DISTRIBUTION OF SOLID WASTE
Congress can reverse the above decisions through the exercise of
its affirmative grant of power under the Commerce Clause.9"
Indeed, the Court's authority to scrutinize state laws under the
"dormant" commerce clause is sometimes justified as merely affirming
the choices Congress would have made had it exercised its Commerce

93.

WILLIAM

L.

KOVACS & MARTHA E. PELLEGRINI, RESOURCE RECOVERY

REPORT, FLOw CONTROL: THE CONTINUING CONFLICr BETWEEN FREE COMPETITION

AND MONOPOLY PUBLIC SERVICE 4 (1992); Parker, supra note 92, at 115.
94. KovAcs & PELLEGRINI, supra note 93, at 5 ("The guaranteed volume

of solid
waste and/or recyclables ensures that the designated facility will be able to produce for sale
a certain amount of energy and/or recyclable materials, or fill its constructed disposal
capacity [thereby guaranteeing the long-term financial viability of the facility.").
95. C & A Carbone, 114 S. Ct. at 1680 (noting that the flow control ordinance
guaranteed a private operator sufficient profit that the operators agreed to sell the solid
waste transfer facility constructed through use of the fees back to the town for $1 after
operating the station for five years); id. at 1684 ("[A]s the most candid of amici and even
Clarkstown admit, the flow control ordinance is a financing measure.").
96. Id. at 1683. But cf id. at 1689, 1691 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that
because "garbage sorting monopoly is achieved at the expense of all competitors, be they
local or nonlocal," law is facially neutral; law still invalid because it imposes an excessive
burden upon interstate commerce).
97. Id. at 1684.
98. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3.
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Clause power.9 9 Under the doctrine of PrudentialInsurance Co. v.
Benjamin,"° Congress's Commerce Clause authority includes the

power to authorize state regulation of interstate commerce that would
otherwise violate the dormant- commerce, clause.' 1 Consequently,
Congress could specifically authorize state regulation of interstate

commerce in waste through state flow control laws, import bans, or
discriminatory surcharges.

However, whether Congress should abandon the national free
market mechanism currently enforced through the Court's dormant
commerce clause jurisprudence in favor of state regulation of the
market is not easily answered. Both the national market and the
various alternatives authorizing states to restrict that market aid
certain goals and values at the expense of others. The following
discussion suggests four criteria according to which Congress could
decide whether to alter the status quo: economic efficiency, protection of human health and the environment, state autonomy, and
equity. To illustrate the relevance of each criterion to such a decision,

99. One argument for the Court's authority under the dormant commerce clause is
that congressional failure to regulate implies that Congress intended to leave that
particular type of interstate commerce unregulated. See Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275,
282 (1875); Daniel A. Farber, State Regulation and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 3
CONST. COMM. 395, 412 (1986); Redish & Nugent, supra note 5, at 588.
100. 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
101. Id at 438-40; see also Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys., 472 U.S. 159, 174 (1985) (noting that Congress's enactment of the Bank
Holding Company Act prevents attack on state regulation of bank acquisitions by out-ofstate companies pursuant to the Commerce Clause). The Prudentialdoctrine appears to
have originated in the case of Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S.
(18 How.) 421 (1855), in which Congress authorized the construction of a bridge
connecting Pennsylvania and what is now West Virginia even though the Court had
previously held that the bridge obstructed interstate commerce. It should be noted that
the doctrine applies only to the Commerce Clause. Consequently, Congress's power to
authorize regulations that would otherwise violate the dormant commerce clause does not
extend to state discrimination against out-of-state citizens in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, or the Privileges and Immunities Cause
of Article IV, § 2. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 525 (2d ed.
1988). Thus, for example, it is not clear whether the Equal Protection Clause would bar
Congress from authorizing states to tax out-of-state bottling companies at a higher rate
than in-state bottling companies in order to slow the flow of discarded bottles into their
landfills. See Metropolitan Life Ins. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 880-82 (1985) (holding that
state law taxing foreign insurance companies at higher rates than domestic insurance
companies in order to promote domestic businesses violates Equal Protection Clause).
Similarly, it is not clear that the Privileges and Immunities Clause would allow Congress
to authorize a state to charge a nonresident visitor more to dispose of her trash than it
charges its own residents. For the distinction between the Commerce Clause and
Privileges and Immunities Clause, see Jonathan D. Varat, State "Citizenship" and Interstate
Equality, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 487, 499-501 (1981).
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the following section discusses whether the given criterion favors
retaining the national market or favors restricting the market through
the use of an import ban."°
A. Economic Efficiency
If Congress were to follow the dominant intellectual approach to
the analysis of pollution and public health problems, its first priority
would be to institute an economically efficient mechanism for
distributing waste. 3 Under this approach, environmental quality

102. The import ban is used here as a representative example of regulatory restrictions.
Part IV will separately examine each of the types of state regulation at issue in the recent
dormant commerce clause cases for how they fare under each of the four criteria. See
infra notes 252-63 and accompanying text.
Although the following discussion frames the issue in terms of the trade-offs inherent
in retaining the national market in solid waste versus authorizing states to regulate the
national market, much of the discussion is relevant to the threshold issue of the trade-offs
inherent in distributing waste according to a market mechanism as opposed to a
nonmarket mechanism. In the absence of the market, lawmakers could determine the
location of waste disposal according to any of a number of different mechanisms, including
democratic decision making or even a lottery.
Many of the advantages of state regulation of the market discussed in the following
sections of this Article are arguments against use of the market per se as a wastedistributing mechanism. Use of the market to distribute waste can be criticized for
ignoring market failures, for "commodifying" matters involving health, for unfairly
distributing health risks according to existing inequalities in wealth, and for failing to
impose incentives that would implement the ecological imperative of reduced waste
generation. Similarly, many of the advantages of a national market are also advantages
to retaining the market as society's preferred mechanism for distributing waste. For
instance, assuming an absence of market failures, a market in the distribution of waste is
generally considered more efficient than nonmarket mechanisms.
Although an in-depth comparison of market and nonmarket mechanisms for the
distribution of waste is beyond the scope of this Article, in comparing the trade-offs
inherent in distributing waste according to a national market as opposed to a staterestricted market, this Article nevertheless indicates the most important considerations that
would be at stake in such a comparison.
103. See The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990,42 U.S.C. §§ 7651(a)-7651(e) (Supp.
V 1993) (establishing system of marketable permits for the emission of sulfur dioxide);
WILLIAM F. BAXTER, PEOPLE OR PENGUINS: THE CASE FOR OPTIMAL POLLUTION 15-34
(1974) (arguing that environmental problems are economic problems, and better insight
can be gained by the application of economic analysis); Thomas 0. McGarity, MediaQuality, Technology, and Cost-Benefit BalancingStrategiesfor Health and Environmental
Regulation, 46 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 159,166 (1983) ("The weltanschauung of the policyoriented economist has come to dominate the intellectual analysis of the pollution control
and worker health policy problems."); see also ROBERT DORFMAN & NANCY S.
DORFMAN, ECONOMICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT: SELECTED READINGS (1977) (analyzing
the competing tasks of economists to protect the environment and to uphold the flow of
useful goods and services); DOUGLAS C. NORTH & ROGER L. MILLER, THE ECONOMICS
OF PUBLIC ISSUES 173-76 (1983) (noting the failures of the Clean Air Act addressed by
market mechanisms); RICHARD STEWART & JAMES E. KRIER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
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is like any other commodity on which Americans spend their money,
and thus it should be measured according to consumers' willingness

to pay.'04 The efficiency criterion favors the mechanism for
distributing waste that results in the exploitation of economic
resources "in such a manner as to maximize human satisfaction, as
measured by consumer willingness to pay for goods and services."1 5
Arriving at the best mechanism for achieving economic efficiency
is more difficult than defining the concept. Markets are only one
mechanism for achieving efficiency 6 The efficiency of a given
market depends on the conditions under which the market
operates.3 7

Among other requirements, perfect markets demand

that consumers and producers have perfect information, that there be
no transaction costs, and that the consumption and production
decisions of one individual not affect those of any other through
nonmarket mechanisms (i.e., they must affect them in ways mediated
by the market).0 8 This latter requirement demands that there be

no externalities. Given the rarity of perfect markets, it is often more

AND POLICY (1978) (presenting an economic framework in which to view environmental
problems as conflicting claims on natural resources).
104. McGarity, supra note 103, at 180.
105. RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 10 (2d ed. 1977). More
generally, efficiency refers to the relationship between the aggregate costs and benefits of
a given situation, or "the size of the pie." In layman's terms, an efficient allocation is one
that makes the size of the pie bigger. The most widely accepted definition of efficiency
is that of Pareto optimality, the state of equilibrium where there is no change that would
make at least one person better off and no one else worse off. A. MITCHELL POLINSKY,
AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 7 n.4 (2d ed. 1989). In contrast, "equity,"
discussed infra notes 188-251 and accompanying text, usually refers to how the pie is to
be divided. Traditionally, the two concerns have not mixed; efficiency concerns have been
viewed as the domain of economists and equity concerns the domain of legislators. See
A. MYRICK FREEMAN ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 80-81

(1973). This Article calls for consideration of both equity and efficiency, mirroring the
trend over the last decade toward increased overlap between the two disciplines. See
Michael Enbar, Equity in the Social Sciences, in EQUITY ISSUES INRADIOACTIVE WASTE
MANAGEMENT 4 (Roger E. Kasperson ed., 1983).
106. Under the assumption that resources are shifted according to voluntary
transactions, it is a fair bet that the shift results in a net increase in efficiency since the
transaction would not have occurred if both parties did not think it would make them
better off. POSNER, supra note 105, at 11.
107. EDITH STOKEY & RICHARD ZECKHAUSER, A PRIMER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS 292

(1978) ("[flndividual choices yield an impressive result if the market satisfies the ideal
conditions that are required to make it perfectly competitive. A Pareto optimal outcome,
an outcome that is efficient, will automatically be generated.").
108. Id. at 293-94.
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efficient to resort to nonmarket mechanisms or combinations of
nonmarket and market mechanisms.' 1°
Assuming that the current national market operates under ideal
conditions, retention of the unregulated national market would be
more efficient than allowing states to impose barriers to the free flow
of waste. Were Congress to authorize waste import bans, for
example, the result could be fifty separate markets for the disposal of
waste. Because nation-sized markets allow for regionalization of
waste disposal,"' they are inherently more efficient than state-sized
markets. Regionalization will reduce disposal costs by allowing
disposal companies to take advantage of economies of scale and
comparative advantage. By building a larger facility that accepts
more waste, the disposal company can spread its fixed costs-construction, operation, and closure of a facility--over larger revenues."'
Although distribution of waste through a national market increases
transportation
costs, waste can be transported cheaply over moderate
12
distances.

109. ALLEN BUCHANAN, ETHIcs, EFFICIENCY, AND THE MARKET 15 (1985) (arguing
that the efficiency argument for the free market is based upon the assumption that actual
markets sufficiently approximate ideal markets so as to make them preferable to alternatives to a nonmarket system); Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying
Cease Further,100 YALE LU. 1211, 1214 (1991) ("[N]either market nor nonmarket forms
of organization are primary; rather, they are two approaches which interrelate in oddly
symmetrical ways as (a) people seek to find the most efficient (least costly) way of
structuring their relationships.. . ."); see also POSNER, supra note 105, at 271 (arguing that
the concept of market failure should be balanced by one of gevernment failure).
110. For present purposes, regionalization refers to the collection of waste from a large
area encompassing parts of several states and disposing of it at a single facility located in
one state.
111. For instance, when EPA modified its Regulatory Impact Analysis on the costs of
environmental standards for municipal solid waste landfills to account for an assumed
increase in regionalization of waste disposal, the predicted costs of complying with the
regulations fell significantly. 53 Fed. Reg. 50987 (1988); see also id. ("Landfill size is a key
factor in determining the cost per ton, with larger landfills benefiting significantly from
economies of scale."); id. at 81 (statement of Don R. Clay, Assistant Administrator of
Solid Waste and Emergency Response, U.S. EPA) (arguing that disposal of waste in outof-state facilities will become increasingly prevalent as new, larger landfills and waste
combusters replace older and smaller facilities in order to capitalize on economies of
scale); Stewart, supra note 13, at 1338 (arguing that free trade in wastes should promote
joint welfare through the achievement of economies of scale in disposal techniques). Some
economists are opposed to federal legislation requiring state self-sufficiency in waste
disposal because it will make the construction of such large regional facilities less feasible.
See Walls & Marcus, supra note 34, at 11 (arguing that restrictions on waste imports could
halt construction of large, state-of-the-art facilities that serve a large number of
communities).
112. See Walls & Marcus, supra note 34, at 7. The pollution resulting from the
transportation of solid waste must also be factored into the costs of the national market,
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However, the assumption that waste is distributed according to

ideal market conditions disintegrates under closer scrutiny. There are
numerous costs associated with waste disposal that are potentially

external to those covered by the tipping fees charged by private waste
disposal operators. These externalities include the administrative and
legal costs related to the siting, permitting, and monitoring of disposal
facilities; decreases in property values; health problems resulting from
environmental contamination; natural resource losses; and the
nuisance costs related to the traffic congestion and odors emanating
from a disposal site.113 Finally, some have argued that residents
living in communities in which a dump site is located experience
"stigma" or "demoralization" costs.114
The administrative and legal costs may be incurred at the

state" 5 or local level, or both. Local governments, however, will
sustain the bulk of the costs. For instance, local governments must
select or approve the selection of a facility and process all requisite
permits and zoning variances."' Local governments also shoulder
however. Such pollution will decrease the efficiency of the regionalization of the national
market.
113. David Littell, The Omission of Materials Separation Requirements from Air
Standardsfor Municipal Waste Incinerators: EPA's Commitment to Recycling Up in
Flames, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 601, 619 (1991) (arguing that municipal waste
incinerators impose externalities upon the residents of the surrounding community); Walls
& Marcus, supra note 34, at 9; Mary Beth Arnett, Comment, Down in the Dumps and
Wasted The Need Determinationin the Wisconsin Landfill Siting Process, 1987 WISC. L.
REv. 543,545 n.12 ("The socioeconomic costs of landfill siting include diminished property
values, reduced community tax base, nuisance concerns such as odors, noise, and increased
traffic on local roads, and in some cases, the stigma of being a regional dumping ground.").
114. See Arnett, supra note 113, at 545 n.12; see also R. George Wright, Hazardous
Waste Disposaland the Problems of Stigmatic and Racial Injury, 23 Ariz. ST. LJ.777,785
(1991) ("Being, or being perceived as, the region or nation's 'dumping ground' is thus a
very real, if quite intangible, sort of injury ... properly ... referred to as stigmatic in
character.").
115. Most states and territories impose some set of environmental standards for
municipal solid waste landfills. 53 Fed. Reg. 33,320 (1988); Robert Steuteville, The State
of Garbage in America, BIoCYCLE, Apr. 1990, at 34. Moreover, the new federal
environmental regulations for municipal solid waste disposal facilities place the
responsibility for compliance on state authorities. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 257-258 (1993); supra
notes 29-31. Finally, in the event of later contamination triggering a Superfund cleanup
action, the state may be liable for part of these costs should the potentially responsible
parties not cover the full costs. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(3) (1988) (providing for federal
cleanup action conditioned upon state agreement to assure future maintenance costs and
10% of the costs of cleanup).
116. See, e.g., 53 PA. STAT. ANN. § 4000.511 (1994) (establishing municipal waste
planning and siting legislation); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 144.445 (1991-1992) (establishing local
siting committee staffed by local municipal officials); see also William D. Preston &
Thomas M. DeRose, The 1988 Solid Waste Management Act-Facing Up To The
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the losses resulting from drops in property values related to waste
disposal," 7 because lower property values mean fewer tax dollars.
This could affect the ability of the locality to fund certain services
such as schools, hospitals, and social programs. A particularly noxious
waste disposal facility may also chase away new or current businesses
and residents, further affecting the tax base.
Some of the above costs should or can sometimes be internalized
in the costs of waste disposal. For example, new federal regulations
for municipal solid waste landfills should reduce the magnitude of
natural resource losses and health harm attributable to environmental
contamination." 8 Common law liability is always available to
compensate for health and property damage resulting from environmental contamination." 9 Furthermore, state and local regulatory
costs associated with permitting and siting a facility may be internalized in the waste disposal market by way of fees imposed upon
waste generators or the private owners and operators of the waste
disposal facilities themselves. Finally, some community costs may be
internalized by the "host fees," or offers of compensation, sometimes
paid by private disposal operators to communities who agree to host
a waste disposal facility. Private waste companies currently use host
fees to overcome the NIMBY syndrome by offering to finance local
improvements, such as schools or public buildings, or by giving the
locality
a percentage of the tipping fee on all waste disposed of at the
°
site.'
Caution is warranted, however, in assuming the effectiveness of
any of these mechanisms in internalizing the externalities of waste
disposal. First, the internalization of costs through government
"Garbage"Component of Florida'sBurgeoning Growth, 16 FLA. ST. L. REV. 598, 606-08
(1988) (describing Florida legislation that imposes significant responsibilities for solid waste
management on local governments).
117. See, e.g., 56 Fed. Reg. 50,978,50,986 (1991) (EPA finding that "ground-water contamination [from municipal landfills] has, in some communities, resulted in decreased
property values").
118. See supra notes 29-30.
119. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §§
86-91, at 616-54 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing the law of public and private nuisance); see also
PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 28, at 133 ("Common law liability has been the principal
alternative to government regulation for protecting the environment.").
120. NATIONAL SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT ASS'N, supra note 48, at 2; Lyle S.
Raymond, Jr. et al., Winning When You Have Lost: Cutting Your Losses with Host
Community Benefits (Cornell Waste Management Institute 1993); Clifford W. Scherer &
Napoleon K. Juanillo, Jr., Public OpinionAbout ProposedHost Community Benefits (First
U.S. Conference on Municipal Solid Waste Management 1990); Walls & Marcus, supra
note 34, at 10.
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regulation, such as the new federal landfill standards, depends upon

an effective enforcement mechanism. Widespread noncompliance
with other environmental laws'

suggests that enforcement of solid

waste disposal laws could be a problem. Second, the tort system
imposes high transaction costs and contains numerous biases-e.g., the

need for a direct causal link between the contamination and the
injury-that work against the private victims of dispersed public risks
such as contamination from solid waste disposal."z Third, although
some states do fund their waste disposal out of user and permitting
fees," many of the nation's largest waste-importing states do
not.24 Fourth, host fees vary widely according to the bargaining
121. See Marianne Lavelle, Environmental Vise: Law, Compliance,NAT'L L.., Aug.
30, 1993, at S1 (reporting that more than two-thirds of the 200 corporate general counsels
responding to a 1993 survey conceded that, at some point during the past year, their
businesses had operated in violation of federal or state environmental laws); Marianne
Lavelle, More Lawyers Expect to Urge Their Clients to Examine Compliance, NAT'L L.I.,
Mar. 16, 1992, at S6 (reporting that 37.4% of the 257 corporate general counsels surveyed
stated that their corporations had never conducted an environmental self-audit and 16%
stated that they have altered their procedures for conducting environmental self-audits for
fear that the violations they find may be used against them); see also Robert R. Kuehn,
Remedying The Unequal Enforcement of Environmental Laws, 9 ST. JOHNS J. LEGAL
COMMENT. 625, 625-26 (1994).
122. N. William Hines, Nor Any Drop to Drink: Public Regulation of Water Quality,
52 IOWA L. REv. 186, 196-201 (1966) (discussing barriers to use of tort law by victims of
pollution); Neil K. Komesar, Injuries and Institutions: Tort Reform, Tort Theory, and
Beyond, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 48-50 (1990) (arguing that because the effects of
environmental harms are usually widely dispersed, they seldom give rise to environmental
torts or attorney's fees); McGarity, supranote 103, at 173-79 (arguing that requirement of
establishing a causal link between injury and exposure, together with transaction costs
barriers to filing suit, render tort system an ineffective substitute for the ideal market
paradigm). But cf Troyen A. Brennan, Environmental Torts, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1, 17
(1993) (arguing that this analysis ignores heterogeneity of environmental paradigms, some
of which are conducive to tort litigation). See generally Clayton P. Gillette & James E.
Krier, Risks, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1027, 1045-60 (1990) (comparing
access bias that works against private plaintiff seeking recovery for environmental harm
with process bias that works against producers of public risks).
123. For example, Louisiana funds most of the state costs attributable to solid waste
disposal in this manner. Telephone Interview with Daryl Serio, Financial Officer,
Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (Aug. 1, 1994). On the increasing
propensity of state and local governments to fund public programs through user fees, see
THOMAS R. DYE, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: COMPETITION AMONG GOVERNMENTS 71-72
(1990).
124. In an amicus brief filed in Oregon Waste Sys. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 114
S. Ct. 1345 (1994), 14 states, seven of which are net importing states and two of
which-Pennsylvania and Indiana-are among the nation's top five net importers, see
Repa, supra note 36, stated that they fund at least part of the regulatory costs of waste
disposal out of general tax revenues. Brief of the States of Indiana, Arkansas, Florida,
Maine, Mississippi, Montana, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Wisconsin
and Wyoming, and the Commonwealths of Kentucky and Pennsylvania, as Amicus Curiae
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power of the community.? s There is no assurance, therefore, that
such fees will internalize all of the community's costs.
In the absence of effective mechanisms to internalize costs, the
current distribution of waste under the national market cannot be
assumed to be efficient. In fact, given sufficiently large externalities,
a system of state barriers could be more efficient than the national
market. This would be the case if the cost savings attributable to the
externalities discussed above were responsible for all interstate waste
trade. Although this is improbable, the presence of significant
externalities removes the presumption of efficiency.
Without the aid of a perfectly functioning market, an economist
might attempt to determine the relative efficiency of the national
market vis-a-vis state import bans according to the tool of cost-benefit
analysis. 26 The purpose of cost-benefit analysis is to point decision
makers to forms of government intervention in the market that either
overcome market failures or result in direct allocations of resources
where no market exists. 27 Under cost-benefit analysis, a decision
maker makes the policy choice that produces the greatest net social
benefit."2 Where the benefit-to-cost ratio of a particular policy
choice is maximized and benefits exceed costs, government regulation
is efficient under the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, even if not under the
Pareto criterion. 29

in Support of Respondents at 1-2, Oregon Waste Sys. (Nos. 93-70, 93-108).
125. See, e.g., Jeff Bailey, Economics of Trash: Some Big Waste Firms Pay Some Tiny
Towns Little for Dump Sites, What Localities Get Depends on Their BargainingSkill, and
Fees Vary Widely, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 1991, at Al (noting that depending on locality's
bargaining skills, host fees paid by commercial disposal companies can vary from a total
fee of about $25,000 to an annual fee of $10 million); Allan R. Gold, Wanted, Land for
Dump Sites; Benefits Offered, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1990, at B4.
126. See STEVENS, supra note 14, at 305-08 (arguing that cost-benefit analysis may be
used to determine the efficiency of a policy alternative where markets are imperfect due
to externalities, because cost-benefit analysis incorporates positive externalities as benefits
and negative externalities as costs). In the past, Congress has required that federal
agencies engage in cost-benefit analysis prior to commencing projects with significant
environmental effects or promulgating regulations with significant costs to the economy.
See National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(B) (1988); E.O. 12291, 3
C.F.R. 127 (1981).
127. PETER S. MENELL & RICHARD B. STEWART, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY
82, 83 (1994).
128. STOKEY & ZECKHAUSER, supra note 107, at 137.
129. Under the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, a change is efficient if the benefit it causes one
person creates a net gain sufficient to allow that person to compensate those injured by
the change, regardless of whether those injured are ever actually compensated. McGarity,
supra note 103, at 166-67. Under the Pareto criterion of efficiency, a change is preferred
if at least one person would be made better off and no one would be made worse off. See
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A detailed cost-benefit analysis is, of course, beyond the scope of
the present Article. Nevertheless, we can translate the basic
underlying theory of cost-benefit analysis into a common sense rule
Society should choose between
of rational economic choice:
distributing waste in a national market or in fifty state-sized markets
based upon which has the greatest potential to maximize social
welfare. It should be noted that the object of this inquiry is not to
determine the most welfare-maximizing mechanism for the disposal
of waste (which may well be something very different than either its
distribution through the national market or according to state import
bans), but only to compare these two options for controlling its
distribution for eventual disposal. 3 ' In addition the distinction
between the two options that dictates the result of this comparison is
the ultimate location for that portion of the total volume of waste
generated in the United States that is disposed of out-of-state under
the national market option'. The only relevant difference between the
national market and the state-sized market option for our immediate
purposes, therefore, is that, under the state-sized market option, this
volume of waste will be disposed of within the state in which it was
generated, while it will be disposed of out-of-state under the national
market option.
For several reasons, one can argue that waste will be disposed of
more cheaply when distributed according to the national free market
than under a scheme allowing states to impose obstacles to the free
flow of waste. First, because waste-importing states have lower
population densities,' 3 ' the consumer costs of waste disposal should
be lower when waste is distributed in the national market. Consumer
waste disposal costs will reflect real estate and siting costs, both of
which should be lower in a more sparsely-populated state due to the
comparative lack of competition for landfill sites. Population density
could also affect the magnitude of the public and private health costs

supra note 105.
130. This comparison thus does not engage in the difficult ethical and valuational
debates surrounding cost-benefit analysis. See, e.g., Herman B. Leonard & Richard J.
Zeckhauser, Cost-Benefit Analysis Applied to Risks: Its Philosophy and Legitimacy, in
VALUES AT RISK 42 (Douglas Maclean ed., 1986); McGarity, supranote 103, at 199. For
a closer examination of the problems raised by using "willingness to pay" (otherwise
known as the "offer-asking" problem) to determine value in cost-benefit analysis, see Mark
Kelman, Consumption Theory, ProductionTheory, and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 52
S. CAL. L. REV. 669,682 (1978-79); Duncan Kennedy, Cost-BenefitAnalysis of Entitlement
Problems: A Critique,33 STAN. L. REV. 387, 401-10 (1981).
131. See infra Appendix, Table 1.
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resulting from landfill disposal simply because fewer persons will be
harmed in the event of environmental contamination."
The lower per capita incomes of residents of waste-importing
states should also render the costs of disposing of wastes under a
national market mechanism lower than those incurred under the state
import ban approach. 33 Because this assures the lowest losses in
terms of wages, it is cheaper for society overall if whatever health
harm results from exported waste harms those with the lowest
incomes."M This same rule should apply with respect to drops in
property values attributable to location near a waste disposal site.
Assuming property values correlate with income, the national market
option channels losses in property values to states where property
values are already lower.
Losses attributable to contaminated natural resources may be the
most difficult to compare, though a strong argument can be made that

132. The assumption that lower population density will lower total waste disposal costs
rests upon a few important assumptions which, though they appear reasonable, could be
rebutted upon the collection of more data. First, this assumes that total volumes of waste
imported are not so large as to cause the importing state to build proportionately more
landfills (or other types of waste disposal facilities) than the exporting state. For example,
were the volumes of waste imported to require the importing locality to site two landfills
instead of one, the cost reductions attributable to exporting waste to lower population
density states would be lost. The siting of two landfills in a locality with a low population
density would more closely approximate the tax losses and potential health costs of one
landfill sited in a high density locality. However, the fact that the importing states also
have lower waste per square mile ratios than exporting states, see infra Appendix, Table
1, appears to indicate that the cost reductions from lower population densities is not lost
as the result of importation of greater volumes of waste. Importing states have lower
waste-per-square-mile ratios both before and after the volumes of waste they import is
taken into account.
The second assumption is that the distribution of the population in exporting and
importing states is roughly the same. For instance, regardless of lower statewide
population densities, the costs of waste disposal would not be lowered as a result of
disposing of waste in low population density importing states if the population of the
exporting state is concentrated in a small area of the state (one large city, for example)
while the population of the importing state is spread evenly throughout the state's
territory. In such a case, the costs of waste disposal in the importing state would be higher
despite the importing state's lower overall population density because disposal facilities
could not be sited away from populated areas.
133. See infra Appendix, Table 1.
134. This latter judgment was used by a former World Bank economist to justify his
recommendation that developed countries such as the United States ship their toxic waste
to developing nations for disposal. Let Them Eat Pollution, ECONOMIST, Feb. 8, 1992, at
66 (quoting a memorandum by Lawrence Summers stating that "a given amount of healthimpairing pollution should be done in the country with the lowest cost, which will be the
country with the lowest wages. I think the economic logic behind dumping a load of toxic
waste in the lowest-wage country is impeccable .... ").
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they too will be lower under the national market option. Due to the
opportunities to regionalize, the national market option should lead
to the construction of fewer disposal facilities and thus to the devotion
of fewer natural resources to waste disposal. Furthermore (and more
controversially), if "willingness to pay" is used to measure the
resulting resource losses, the lower incomes of the local population
in
135
importing states could lower the "value" of these resources.
An extremely rough estimate of the relative costs of the two
options, therefore, demonstrates that the national market approach
should result in lower total social costs attributable to waste disposal
than the state import ban approach. Because the benefits of either
option should be the reciprocal of their costs, the benefits of either
distribution should be proportionately the same as their costs.
Consequently, although the presence of externalities means that the
national market is not, in and of itselft an efficient mechanism for the
distribution of waste, as comparedto state import barriers,the national
market is probably a more efficient mechanism for the distribution of
the nation's total waste disposal costs.
It must be emphasized that important unknowns may affect the
relative costs of the two options. For example, considering that a
state acquires the reputation of being the dumping ground for other
states' waste, the national market option entails costs to importing
states attributable to lost business opportunities and citizen
demoralization. These costs are not obviously relevant under the
state import ban option because each state must dispose of its own
wastes. Furthermore, we know very little about the cumulative
environmental effects of disposing of large volumes of waste in a
given ecosystem. If the marginal costs of natural resource damages
attributable to waste disposal increase after reaching some specified
threshold, the concentration of large volumes of waste in one area
under the national market option could impose higher costs than
would spreading out the disposal of waste across fifty states. Finally,
all of the costs of the state import ban model may be overstated if,
despite the opportunity, not all states impose barriers to the impor135. This rests upon the assumption that the local population's lower ability to pay is
manifested in the method used to measure the value of the natural resources. This may
depend upon the method used. See R.G. CUMMINS Er AL., VALUING ENVIRONMENTAL
GOODS: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE CONTINGENT VALUATION METHOD (1986) (arguing

that where survey techniques are used, respondents may strategically overstate their real
willingness to pay). The willingness-to-pay concept is controversial because it assumes that
environmental benefits are things that citizens must purchase, rather than that citizens have
an entitlement to a pristine environment that polluters must purchase.
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tation of out-of-state waste. Some states may value the business of
waste disposal operators and the host fees communities received from
them above the environmental and health benefits of excluding outof-state waste. If several states declined to enact waste import bans,
a hybrid of the national market could develop that would temper the
inefficiency of the state import ban alternative.
B. Protectionof Human Health and the Environment
A second relevant criterion is the protection of human health and
the environment, which must be considered separately from economic
efficiency. Although environmental law draws heavily from economic
analysis,136 a distinct strain of environmental theory rejects capping
'
environmental protection at what is allocatively "efficient."137
This
strain derives from an ethical perspective on environmentalism that
calls for respect for the inherent rights of the nonhuman natural world
and the values to be found in it,'38 as well as skepticism that we
know enough to predict when our impacts upon ecological and human
health will exceed "efficient" levels. 39

136. See, e.g., MENELL & STEWART, supra note 127, at 44-81.
137. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1988) (establishing a virtually
cost-oblivious goal "that the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters be eliminated
by 1985"); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7408 (1988) (specifying cost-oblivious health-based
standards for ambient air pollutants); Union Elec. Co. v. EPA 427 U.S. 246, 265 (1976)
(stating that the EPA is not required to consider economic feasibility of Clean Air Act
requirements where state has chosen to force technology); Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647
F.2d 1130, 1150 (D.C. Cir.) (holding that EPA Administrator may not consider economic
and technological feasibility in setting air quality standards), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1042
(1980). For instance, an ecologically based rejection of an efficiency cap might require that
groundwater contamination from a landfill should be cleaned up even if it would be
cheaper to society to provide the few persons residing near the landfill with bottled water.
138. See, e.g., Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (1988 & Supp. V
1993); EARTHBOuND: NEW INTRODUCTORY ESSAYS IN ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS (T.
Regan ed., 1984); ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC AND SKETCHES HERE
AND THERE 201-06 (1949); G. P. MARSH, THE EARTH AS MODIFIED BY HUMAN ACTION
(1874); RODERICK F. NASH, THE RIGHTS OF NATURE: A HISTORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL
ETHICS (1989); HOLMES ROLSTON III, ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS (1988); Christopher
Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects,45 S. CAL.
L. REv. 450 (1972).
139. See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011,1041 n.41 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (arguing
that the Clean Water Act demonstrates Congress had doubts that "we have both adequate
information about the effects of pollution to set an optimal test, and adequate political and
administrative flexibility to keep polluters at that level once we allow any pollution to go
untreated"); McGarity, supra note 103, at 180-91 (exploring the defects of the market
paradigm as applied to pollution problems); see also Oliver A. Houck, Of BATs, Birds and
B-A-T The Convergent Evolution of EnvironmentalLaw, 63 MISS. L.J. 403,411-17 (1994)
(relating failure of science to predict thresholds below which there is no biological harm
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Environmentalism supports at least three separately identifiable

definitions of and approaches to the environmental problems
surrounding waste disposal. Under the traditional "end of the pipe"
approach, the problem presented by waste disposal is that of finding
environmentally safe means of disposing of whatever waste is
produced. Accordingly, the distribution of waste is relevant only
insofar as it affects the likelihood of greater environmental contamination from waste disposal. Under the newly emerging alternative approach, the environmental problem presented by waste
disposal is the existence of the waste itself Under this perspective,
the distribution of waste matters to the extent that it effects waste
reduction. Finally, the perspective of environmental ethics posits that
whether waste is disposed of close to or far from home is relevant to

whether humans are living within nature's bounds. The following
discussion examines how these perspectives may be interpreted to call

for quite different mechanisms for the distribution of waste.
1. The Traditional Approach: Creating More Capacity
Most federal pollution control laws attempt to minimize the
adverse environmental impacts of pollution after the pollution has
already been created, rather than to prevent the creation of pollution
in the first place. Historically, Congress's approach to the problem of
solid waste is no exception, being almost entirely related to the safe
management and disposal of waste through compliance with more
environmentally protective standards.'
Under this traditional
approach, the mechanism for distributing waste is relevant only

or harm to human health to ineffective regulatory approaches to pollution control). The
vastness of what we do not know is illustrated by the aftermath of the 1989 Exxon Valdez
oil spill. After spending $100 million and conducting more than 100 studies, scientists are
still unsure of the spill's effects upon the ecosystem of Alaska's Prince William Sound.
Wesley Loy, Dredgingfor Lessons from the Tragedy in Prince William Sound, WASH.
POST., Feb. 15, 1993, at A3. For a discussion of the conflicts between the economic and
the more ethical bases of environmental law, see Mark Sagoff, The Principles of Federal
Pollution Control Law, 71 MINN. L. REV. 19, 79 (1986); Mark Sagoff, We Have Met the
Enemy and He is Us or Conflict and Contradictionin Environmental Law, 12 ENVTL. L.
283, 290-315 (1982).
140. See Subtitle C of RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6939 (1988) (specifying a cradle-tograve system for tracking and disposing of hazardous waste after waste has already been
generated); Subtitle D of RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6949(a) (1988) (specifying a similar approach
with respect to nonhazardous solid waste). There are exceptions, of course. In the 1984
amendments to RCRA, Congress added a requirement that hazardous waste treatment,
storage, and disposal facilities obtain a certification from generators that they have in place
a program to reduce the amount and toxicity of waste to the degree "economically
practicable." 42 U.S.C. § 6925(h) (1988).
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insofar as it affects whether waste is disposed of according to
environmental standards or is instead disposed of illegally or at
facilities operating without the requisite controls. In analyzing the
advantages and disadvantages of employing national or state-sized
markets for distributing waste according to the traditional environmentalist approach, predictions based upon short and long term
disposal trends are helpful.
While presenting some trade-offs, the traditional approach favors
distribution according to the national market in the short term, and
according to state-sized markets in the long term. At the present
time, solid waste disposal capacity is subject to severe shortages in
certain regions of the country, especially the Northeast.14 ' The
opportunity for the Northeast to export its waste to another state
avoids the environmental contamination from illegal dumping that
could occur in the absence of such an option. 4 ' Consequently,
because needed disposal capacity may now be available only in other
states, in the short term the traditional approach favors retaining the
national market so that this capacity may be utilized.
Yet because the ultimate solution to the environmental problem
of waste disposal under the traditional approach is greater waste
disposal capacity, in the long term this approach could be interpreted
to support state restrictions upon the flow of waste. The very
opportunity to export one's waste for disposal elsewhere arguably
eliminates all incentives to create new disposal capacity or to reduce
the rate of waste generation. 43 For residents of exporting states,
interstate transport of waste allows wholesale avoidance of the

141. MCCARTHY, supra note 39, at 8.
142. While there is some evidence that this very opportunity also makes possible the
disposal of waste in substandard facilities and facilities operating in-states with weak
regulatory staffs, see supra note 121, the problem of contamination from substandard
facilities can be more directly addressed through strengthened environmental controls than
through restrictions upon the national market in waste disposal. This should be provided
by the new federal standards for municipal solid waste disposal facilities under Subtitle D
of RCRA. See supratext accompanying notes 29-31. Indeed, restrictions on waste imports
will do little to stop the contamination from these facilities other than perhaps causing a
few to go out of business. It is likely that they would continue to contaminate the
environment even if they accepted only waste generated within their state. On the other
hand, elimination of the safety valve of out-of-state export would cause an immediate crisis
for states with insufficient waste disposal capacity.
143. See, e.g., Interstate Transportationof Solid Waste, supra note 44, at 21 (statement
of Hon. Ben Erdreich, Congressman from Alabama) (arguing that current practice of
shipping waste across state lines solves the immediate problem of waste disposal, but
delays long-term planning for disposal capacity).
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problem, while for the residents of importing states,'" the devotion
of available capacity to out-of-state trash only exacerbates the
NIMBY reaction to proposals to site new facilities.'45 The result
is a gradual decrease in overall waste disposal capacity as older

facilities close and are not replaced by new facilities or waste
reduction initiatives.
Economic analysis supports adoption of state restrictions on
interstate commerce in waste as a solution to the problem of
inadequate waste-disposal capacity. Under free-market conditions,
one state's landfill can be regarded as a quasi-public good"4 because
it cannot be supplied to the citizens of one state without also being

supplied to the citizens of other states. According to standard
economic analysis, the market will undersupply public goods because
consumers will pay nothing for the good, knowing that they can freeride others' purchase of it, and because producers will lack an
incentive to produce the good when they cannot cover the costs of
production due to the number of nonpaying consumers. 47 If out-ofstate residents are substituted for "consumers" and in-state residents

are. substituted for "producers" (due to the costs they expend in
authorizing the siting of a landfill, even where the landfill is privately
owned and operated), the public-goods analysis explains the existing
lack of landfill capacity under national free-market conditions.

144. While this is the conventional wisdom, it could be argued that it is refuted by New
Jersey's experience. Although the second largest net waste exporter in the nation, New
Jersey also has the second highest rate of trash recycling of any state and is actively siting
new disposal facilities. See Robert Steuteville, 1994 Nationwide Survey: The State of
Garbagein America, BIoCYCLE, Apr. 1994, at 48. However, because these efforts are the
result of the higher projected price of continued reliance upon out-of-state disposal
options, New Jersey might not undertake such actions if disposal in-state were not
expected to be cheaper.
145. Interstate Transportationof Solid Waste, supra note 44, at 156 (statement of E.
Dennis Muchnicki, Chief, Environmental Enforcement Section, Ohio Office of Attorney
General) (predicting that state citizens will block siting of disposal facility unless they are
assured that no out-of-state waste will be accepted).
146. A public good is any good that cannot be supplied to one person without at the
same time enabling large numbers of people to enjoy the good because it is impractical to
exclude their use. See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E. OATES, ECONOMICS,
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND THE QUALITY OF LIE 75 (1979); see also STOKEY &

ZECKHAUSER, supra note 107, at 306-07 (1978) (listing the three attributes of public goods
as nonprovision (or extreme underprovision), nonrivalry (one person's consumption does
not reduce another's consumption), and nonexcludability (impossibility of excluding
noncontributors)). Classic examples of public goods are national defense, lighthouses,
highways, and the court system. MENELL & STEWART, supra note 127, at 54.
147. MENELL & STEWART, supra note 127, at 54-55.
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Economic analysis also supports state access barriers as a solution
to the capacity problem because they would give landfills the
characteristic of excludability that they currently lack. It must be
noted, however, that this is not the only solution to the public-goods
dilemma. Other ways to overcome this barrier to siting new facilities
include governmental provision of landfills"~ and requirements that
the disposal facility itself compensate the local community for its
added costs. This option is closest to the increasingly prevalent
practice whereby waste disposal facilities offer communities compenfees" in exchange for the communities' agreement to
sation or "host
149
site a facility.
2. The Pollution Prevention Approach: Reducing Waste
Generation
One of the most significant developments in environmental law
is the recent emphasis on preventing the generation of pollution, as
opposed to simply controlling the environmental effects of pollution
after it has been generated. 50 While the traditional approach was
born out of the assumption that technology could be developed that
would prevent health and environmental harm from pollution, 5 ' this
new emphasis stems from a realization that this assumption is often
false and that technology is not always capable of eliminating
pollution risks once pollution has been created. As far as waste is
concerned, reducing waste by reducing its generation'5 2 and channeling as much waste as possible back into the production cycle
through recycling has a double benefit. Not only does it reduce
environmental contamination from waste disposal, but it conserves
raw materials and natural resources-trees, oil, unspoiled land-that
148. Id. at 69-70 (arguing that government provision of good will solve the public-goods
problem). If the Supreme Court agrees with several lower court holdings that public
ownership exempts a state from the dormant commerce clause, this option will have the
same effect as that of eliminating the characteristic of nonexcludability.
149. See infra notes 246-51 and accompanying text.
150. See Pollution Prevention Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 13101-09 (Supp. V 1993).
151. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b) (1988); H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 110 (1977), reprintedin 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1188.
152. One environmental group estimates that 30 to 50% of the waste now being
transported across state boundaries could be reduced or recycled, thereby significantly
lessening the need to export waste. Interstate Transportationof Solid Waste, supra note

44, at 297 (statement of Allen Herskowitz, Natural Resources Defense Council). The rate
of generation of waste is higher among Americans than among the citizens of any other
nation. MCCARTHY, supra note 39, at 2. The per capita generation of municipal solid
waste in the United States is double that of Japan and the nations of the European
Community. Id.
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would otherwise be consumed both in the manufacture of products

later discarded as waste, and in the waste disposal process itself.
Distribution of waste may affect pollution prevention through its
impact on measures undertaken to reduce waste generation or to

recycle wastes. Some experts believe that cheap opportunities for
waste export frustrate waste reduction efforts.'

3

These experts

believe creation of more capacity simply encourages the generation
of more waste. Although currently lacking in evidentiary support,54
this view is supported by regulatory regimes as varied as those
employed to end the sexual exploitation of children or the poaching
of endangered species, each of which seeks to eliminate these

offending practices by outlawing the products they produce (child pornography 55 and the hides, horns, or claws of rare animals5").

Although the pollution-prevention approach would, like the
traditional approach, favor state import barriers in the long term, it
would go one step further and mandate a distributive policy for

153. See, e.g., Interstate Transportationof Solid Waste, supra note 44, at 300 (statement
of Allen Hershkowitz, Natural Resources Defense Council) (arguing that the, low-cost
option of exporting municipal solid waste has allowed localities, states, and private
interests to avoid or delay implementing waste reduction or recycling programs or
upgrading disposal facilities with state-of-the-art technology); id. at 47 (statement of Velma
Smith, Friends of the Earth) (arguing that interstate movement of garbage "functions as
a major disincentive to waste reduction"); id. at 17 (Statement of Hon. Doug Bereuter,
Congressman from Nebraska) (arguing that unregulated interstate transport of waste sends
a message that "it is acceptable to continue to generate enormous amounts of trash"); see
also Michael Heiman, From 'Not in My Backyard!' to 'Not in Anybody's Backyard!':
Grass Roots Challenge to Hazardous Waste Facility Siting, 56 APA J., Summer 1990, at
359 (arguing that by blocking the siting of waste disposal facilities, citizens force industry
to reevaluate production processes that produce toxic wastes in the first place).
154. There exists a dearth of studies demonstrating that the scarcity of traditional
disposal options in landfills or incinerators leads to the generation of less waste. There is,
however, considerable anecdotal evidence that the scarcity of disposal options leads to
recycling. See, e.g., Amy Pyle, Pilot Program Will Find Recycling Is Already Up and
Flying, L.A. TIMEs, June 26, 1989, § 2, at 6 (quoting a resident as stating, "I'm opposed
to the Lopez landfill continually staying here, but I realize we have to put our garbage
somewhere. My answer right now is to recycle as much as we can."); Faye Rice, Where
Will We Put All That Garbage?,FORTUNE, Apr. 11, 1988, at 96 ("When 65-year old Milly
Zantow heard that space was running out at the town dump in North Freedom, Wisconsin,
she cashed in an insurance policy and set up her own recycling center..
").
155. See Child Pornography Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)
(prohibiting, inter alia, the receipt of child pornography through the United States mails).
156. See Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (1988) (prohibiting the taking of
any endangered species not permitted by the Secretary of Interior or Commerce);
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 12
I.L.M. 1085 (1973) (conditioning the importation and exportation of specimens of
endangered or threatened species on the presentation of a permit attesting that shipment
will not be detrimental to survival of species).
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recyclable waste products. Although the pollution-prevention
approach would favor a reduction in the waste generated, once waste
is in fact generated, the approach would favor reuse of the waste to
conserve raw materials. The pollution-prevention approach would
favor a national market for recyclable waste. In order to be competitive with raw materials, recyclables must be available to industries
nationwide. Recycling advocates believe that a national market is
critical to the success of recycling because of the current lack of
items or using discarded
industries capable of reprocessing discarded
15 7
items as substitutes for virgin materials.
3. The Perspective of Environmental Ethics
Yet a third approach to environmental protection stresses
humanity's moral obligations to sustain and protect the natural world
and all forms of life. Under this perspective, western civilization has
concentrated on "interhuman ethics"-ways in which persons morally
relate to other persons-to the exclusion of environmental ethics, or
ways in which persons morally relate to the earth and to other forms
of life. 5 ' For some, humanity's moral responsibility to the natural
world springs from the inherent rights of natural objects,159 while for
others it derives from an anthropocentric recognition that human

157. See, e.g., InterstateTransportationof Solid Waste, supranote 44, at 301 (statement
of Allen Hershkowitz, Natural Resources Defense Council); id. at 82-83 (statement of Don
R. Clay, EPA). Until just recently, the market for recycled materials suffered from an
oversupply of collected, recyclable material (glass, newspaper, and aluminum cans) and an
undersupply of companies, such as paper mills, with the equipment necessary to either use
recycled materials as substitutes for raw materials or to turn recyclable materials into
usable materials for other industries. See Nicole Achs, All Dressed Up and Nowhere to
Go, AM. CITY & COUNTY, Nov. 1991, at 26-35; Cheryl L. McAdams, Recycling: Social
Evangelism? or Viable Business? WASTE AGE, Apr. 1994, at 188; Lisa Rabasca, Recycling
in 1993: Ebbs & Flows, WASTE AGE, Dec. 1993, at 69-70. Recent developments, however,
such as a 1993 executive order requiring federal agencies to purchase paper with 20%
recycled fiber, have led to a recent escalation in the price of recyclable materials. See John
Holusha, Recycled Material is Findinga New Lucrative Market, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1994,
at Al. This recent trend does not detract from the importance of a national market for
the continued viability of recycling.
158. Holmes Rolston III, Rights and Responsibilitieson the Home Planet, 18 YALE J.
INT'L L. 251, 252 (1993).
159. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727,741 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting); TOM
REGAN, THE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS 25 (1983); see also PETER SINGER, ANIMAL
LIBERATION passim (2d ed. 1990) (arguing that traditional human behavior unjustly
oppresses animals); CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, SHOULD TREES HAVE STANDING? 9 (1974)
("I am quite seriously proposing that we give legal rights to forests, oceans, rivers and
other so-called 'natural objects' in the environment-indeed, to the natural environment
as a whole.").
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survival depends upon all species' survival."6 For still others,
ecological history compels this responsibility by demonstrating that
humans are members and citizens of the biotic community rather than
its conquerors.' 6 '
Integral to the ethical perspective is the need to regain a concrete

connection with the land so that the satisfaction of human needs does
not exceed the regenerative capacity of the ecosystem.

6

As a

consequence, the literature of environmental philosophy stresses
lifestyles in which people live off the land or are in some way made
acutely aware of their reliance on nature and their need to live within

its bounds." Here environmental ethicists join ranks with progressive economists, who argue that the globalizing tendencies of
neoclassical economics destroy the integrity of both biotic and human
communities by placing economic decisions in the hands of persons
who are not members of the community affected by those decisions
and who will not suffer the consequences of the environmental harm
that they engender.' 64 These economists believe that greater

160. Rolston, supra note 158, at 259 ("Humans depend on air flow, water cycles,
sunshine, photosynthesis, nitrogen-fixation, decomposition bacteria, fungi, the ozone layer,
food chains, insect pollination, soils, earthworms, climates, and genetic materials."); id. at
252 ("If humans are to be true to our species' epithet, 'the wise species' must behave with
appropriate respect for life. Such behavior necessarily will involve interhuman ethics.").
161. ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC AND SKETCHES HERE AND THERE
204-05 (1968).
162. See LEOPOLD, supra note 161 at 214-24 (preservation of the biologic integrity of
the ecosystem cannot exist outside a land ethic that consists primarily of humanity
undertaking the responsibility for ensuring the regenerative capacity of the land by
refraining from perpetrating violent changes to the ecosystem that exceed its capacity to
recover). The ethical imperative of living within the natural limits of the ecosystem is
reflected in the call for "sustainable development" by developing nations. See WORLD
COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPmENT, OUR COMMON FuTuRE 57 (1987)
("If needs are to be met on a sustainable basis the Earth's natural resource base must be
conserved and enhanced .... Land use in agriculture and forestry should be based on a
scientific assessment of the land capacity, and the annual depletion of topsoil, fish stock,
or forest resources must not exceed the rate of regeneration.").
163. LEOPOLD, supra note 161, at 6 ("There are two spiritual dangers in not owning a
farm. One is the danger of supposing that breakfast comes from the grocery, and the
other that heat comes from the furnace."). Perhaps the most eloquent descriptions of this
lifestyle are given by the poet, essayist, and philosopher Wendell Berry. See, e.g.,
WENDELL BERRY, HOME ECONOMICS 72 (1987) (describing living within the limits of
nature as "living within the Great Economy, under the necessity of making our little
human economy within it, according to its terms, the smaller wheel turning in sympathy
with the greater").
164. See, e.g., HERMAN E. DALY & JOHN B. COBB, JR., FOR THE COMMON GOOD 173
(2d ed. 1994).
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economic self-sufficiency at the community
level (i.e., the state and
1 65
local level) would solve the problem.
Environmental philosophy's emphasis on reducing the impacts of
one's everyday decisions to the carrying capacity of one's immediate
environment is consistent with limiting the distribution of waste to
state-sized markets. The freedom to ship one's waste to other states,
as permitted by the national market, is the freedom to live beyond the
carrying capacity of the earth and hence signals disrespect for nature
and the endangerment of the human race. If people are required to
dispose of their waste at home, they are more likely to reduce their
waste-generating habits because they will suffer the adverse effects of
the disposal."
Furthermore, even if they themselves do not
experience the adverse effects, persons within their community will.
Psychologically, it is no doubt easier to harm anonymous individuals
than those with whom one shares a common history or realm of
experience.
The differing theories regarding the priorities of environmental
protection therefore result in a hybrid approach to the optimal
distribution of solid waste. All theories converge in support of state
waste barriers for at least nonrecyclable waste, though they do so for
different reasons. According to the traditional, "end-of-the-pipe"
approach, state barriers will ease the siting of new facilities and

165. Id. at 174.
166. This point underlies one congressional representative's suggestion during a House
hearing that state import bans would set in motion the "cultural revolution" necessary to
force Americans to reduce the amount of trash they generate:
MR. LUKEN: But every time I revisit this . . . the idea always becomes
appealing of saying everybody take care of their own trash, their own garbage.
Let them take care of it whatever way they can, and that is why I suggested
this cultural revolution, that it is not the constitutional right of every American
to dump garbage on the curb and forget about it and let somebody else take care
of it. That might be true of every community.
MR. LEVENSON: We certainly could require States or the communities within
States to manage their own [municipal solid waste]. It will not happen overnight
iMi LUKEN: But if they know they have got to take care of it, it is going to
happen sooner than if they can just ship it to Ohio.
MR. LEVENSON: Right.
MR. LUKEN: Or New Mexico.
MR. LEVENSON: We have to help them do that with much better information.
MR. LUKEN: Or Colorado.
Municipal Solid Waste Disposal Crisis,HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Transportation
and HazardousMaterials of the Committee on Energy and Commerce on H.R. 2099 and
H.R. 2723, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 55 (1989) [hereinafter Municipal Solid Waste Disposal
Crisis].
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thereby relieve the current shortages in, disposal options.

The

perspective of environmental ethics suggests that state barriers will
foster attitudes and practices that are more respectful toward the

earth. Finally, under the pollution-prevention approach, state barriers
should lead to less waste.

For recyclable materials, however, the

pollution-prevention approach would strongly favor a national market.
C. State Autonomy

In light of Congress's propensity to federalize environmental
law,67 the suggestion that Congress consider enhancing state
autonomy may appear mistaken, or, at best, naive. Nevertheless,
despite this propensity and the general demise of state autonomy,"6
state autonomy still plays an important role in environmental policy
in an instrumental sense, if in no other. First, Congress's implementation of national environmental objectives often depends on state
cooperation. Second, the status of states in our constitutional system
imposes limitations upon how Congress may go about enlisting states
to achieve national objectives.
The value of enhancing state authority over environmental policy
is

supported

by

all

the

traditional

rationales

for

state

governments-greater government sensitivity to citizen needs,
increased opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic processes,

167. Federal laws now touch upon nearly all aspects of natural resources conservation,
pollution control, and chemical emergency response. See, e.g., Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-1364 (1988); Toxic Substances Control
Act, 15 U.S.C. 88 2601-2671 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act,
16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (1988); Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1988
& Supp. V 1993); Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531-1544 (1988 & Supp. V 1993);
Forest and Rangeland Resources Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1687 (1988 & Supp. V 1993);
Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1988 & Supp. V 1993);
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); Ocean Dumping Ban
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1401-1445 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); Oil Pollution Act of 1990,33 U.S.C.
§§ 2701-2761 (Supp. 1994); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j-26 (1988);
National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1988); Solid Waste Disposal
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6901-6992K (1988 & Supp. V 1993); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 74017642 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); Emergency Planning and
Community Right-to-Know Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11001-11050 (1988); Pollution Prevention
Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 13101-13109 (Supp. V 1993); Federal Land Policy and
Management Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
168. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528,531 (1985) (striking
down municipal transit authority's exemption from federal wage and hour laws). But cf.
New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992), discussed infra notes 184-87 and
accompanying text.
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and greater government innovation. 69 In addition, however, the
diversity of the environment itself and the benefits of that diversity
for our economic, social, aesthetic, and political norms and
render decentralized decisionmaking especially
institutions 7
important in environmental matters. Since the 1970s, however, the
driving force behind environmental regulation has been the federal
government. Aside from a few statutes that preempt nonidentical
state laws,17 ' the major federal pollution laws establish national
standards that function as "floors" below which state standards are
preempted.'72 Commentators are now reexamining some of the

169. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457-58 (1991); see also Michael W.
McConnell, Federalism: Evaluatingthe Founders' Design,54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 14931500 (1987) (reviewing RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN (1987))
(arguing that the three important advantages of decentralized decisionmaking are
responsiveness to diverse interests and preferences; prevention of the destructive
competition for the benefits provided by government; and innovation and competition in
government); Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy:
Federalismfor a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 3-10 (1988) (arguing that the
advantages of our federal system include the ability of independent state governments to
check the oppressive power of a strong central government and the capacity of states to
serve as well-springs of political force, drawing citizens into the political process, providing
political and cultural diversity, and providing laboratories for new social and economic
programs). California's environmental laws provide excellent examples of the abovedescribed benefits of decision-making at the state level. California, which the Clean Air
Act specifically allows to implement more stringent vehicle emission standards than the
federal government, has required that by 1998 2% of each car manufacturer's new vehicle
fleet sold in California must be zero-emission vehicles (electric cars); this increases to 10%
by 2003. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 44001 (West 1995). Pursuant to the
petition by several northeastern states, EPA is proposing to require that all states within
the Ozone Transport Region comply with the 2% zero-emission requirement. 59 Fed.
Reg. 48,664 (1994) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 85 (proposed Sept. 22, 1994)).
California law also requires that chemicals that may cause cancer be accompanied by a
"clear and reasonable" warning. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25249.5-25249.13
(West 1992). There is no comparable federal labelling requirement.
170. See Richard B. Stewart, The Development of Administrative and QuasiConstitutionalLaw in JudicialReview of EnvironmentalDecisionmaking: Lessons from the
Clean Air Act, 62 IOwA L. REv. 713, 750 (1977).
171. Congress has chosen federal preemption only in the infrequent case of federal
environmental statutes that regulate nationally distributed products. See, e.g., Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136v (1988) (preempting state
standards for labelling and packaging pesticides); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 2617 (1988) (providing for administrative preemption of state standards for the testing,
manufacture, distribution, or use of toxic chemicals); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7543
(1988 & Supp. V 1993) (preempting state standards for emissions from new motor vehicles
and vehicle engines).
172. See, e.g., Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6926 (1988)
(providing that states may administer federal program under their own laws so long as the
state program is equivalent and not inconsistent with the federal program); Clean Air Act,
42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (setting forth minimum requirements for state
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traditional rationales for uniform federal regulation, including the
assumption that decentralized state decisionmaking inevitably leads
to a "race to the bottom" as each state competes for industry.' 3

Notwithstanding this debate, national uniform standards have not
freed Congress of the need to defer to state autonomy. As the

federal government recognizes, states must assist in the implementation of federal programs.' 4

Unless states can be convinced to

implement the federal program through the "carrot" of federal
funding,'

implementation is left to the federal government itself

In an era of dwindling federal agency budgets, this is not always a
practical alterative 76 Consequently, regardless of the relevance
of the more generic arguments for state autonomy, practical
limitations on federal resources require deference to state autonomy
in order to implement national environmental objectives. The greater
the infeasibility of federal administration of the government program
(for example, where the sheer number of regulated entities is large),
the greater the degree of autonomy accorded the state in the

program's implementation.'
plan to meet primary and secondary national ambient air quality standards).
173. See Richard Revesz, Rethinking the "Race to the Bottom," 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210,
1224-27 (1993) (explaining how race-to-the-bottom rationale explains major portions of the
Clean Air Act); see also id. at 1233-44 (arguing that the race to the bottom rationale lacks
a sound theoretical foundation because states that seek to maximize their social welfare
will not legislate environmental standards that are suboptimal); Richard B. Stewart,
Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of
NationalEnvironmentalPolicy, 86 YALE LJ. 1196,1211-12 (1977) (explaining that uniform
federal environmental regulations help to prevent a "race to the bottom" in state
regulation); Stewart, supra note 170, at 747 (explaining why states would fail to choose an
economically desirable nondegradation policy absent federal requirements).
174. See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 28, at 196 (noting that "the major federal
statutes are structured in important ways to preserve state autonomy even at the price of
weakening their implementation").
175. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1383 (1988) (providing water pollution control revolving loan
funds for state implementation of source management programs); 42 U.S.C. § 6948 (1988)
(providing federal financial assistance for state solid waste planning); 42 U.S.C. § 7506(c)
(1988 & Supp. V 1993) (permitting EPA Administrator to prohibit the disbursement of
federal highway funds to states that fail to implement plan for nonattainment areas as
required by the Clean Air Act).
176. Federal grant programs are notorious for quickly drying up, leaving the states with
little incentive to implement a federal program other than to prevent the federal
government from doing so. See PERCIVAL ET AL., supranote 28, at 119 ("While EPA has
the authority to withdraw a delegation of program authority to any state that is not
meeting federal standards, the agency has little incentive to do so since it would add to
EPA's responsibilities without providing additional resources to implement them.");
Stewart, supra note 173, at 1250.
177. For example, state programs implementing the federal standards for underground
petroleum storage tanks are subject to regulatory requirements. See 40 C.F.R. § 281
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Congressional authorization of state barriers to interstate
commerce in waste would, at the very least, enhance state and local
regulatory autonomy over the implementation of federal standards for
the disposal of solid waste. Here it is necessary to be more specific
about how state autonomy is being defined, because state autonomy
can be conceptualized in more than one way. For instance, state
autonomy is often thought to raise questions of the relationship
between states as sovereigns vis-a-vis the national government.'78
The national market does not threaten this conception of state
autonomy. Although states have no control over the volumes of
waste disposed of within their borders, their choices are not dictated
by the national government. A second definition of state autonomy,
however, encompasses the state's authority to protect the environment
within its borders and to control the demands on the state
treasury.'79 Under this definition, Congress's decision to allow states
to impose import barriers directly implicates the authority of a state
to impose barriers to the distribution of waste. State officials
complain that the inability to discriminate against out-of-state waste
hampers their efforts to minimize waste generation and to plan for
long-term disposal capacity,'o complicates environmental enfor-

(1993). In contrast to the requirements applicable to state programs for administering the
permitting of hazardous waste disposal facilities, see 40 C.F.R. § 271 (1993), the
requirements applicable to state programs for administering the standards for underground
storage tanks are less rigorous. While it would be extremely difficult for the EPA to
administer a state program that could apply to a thousand or more underground tanks, it
is plausible that the agency could administer a state program for the permitting of at most
several dozen hazardous waste disposal facilities.
178. See e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528,529-50 (1985).
179. This definition is similar to that argued by one scholar tobe the true meaning of
the Guarantee Clause of the Constitution. Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause
and State Autonomy: Federalismfor a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 22, 36-70
(1988) (arguing that the most obvious meaning of the Guarantee Clause is that the federal
government promises to secure to each state the autonomy necessary to maintain a
republican form of government; state autonomy protected by the Guarantee CLause
includes the right to establish eligibility to vote for state offices, control over the structure
and mechanics of state government, the establishment of qualifications for state offices,
and the setting of wages for state employees).
180. See, e.g., Impact of FederalSolid Waste Legislation:Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Transp.and HazardousMaterials,102d Cong., 1st Sess. 342 (1991) (statement of Arthur
A. Davis, Secretary, Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources) (arguing that
out-of-state waste undermines state and county planning process by making the number
of sites needed uncertain and that visibility of out-of-state waste issue diverts staff and
management time from recycling and design standards).
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cement efforts,181 and diverts state resources from more pressing
regulatory problems."
In addition, the status of states in our constitutional structure
imposes limitations upon Congress's ability to use the states to fulfill
national objectives. This aspect of state autonomy-state autonomy
as a limitation upon the methods employed in the pursuit of national
goals-could be effective if Congress's authorization of state barriers
to solid waste incorporated provisions requiring that states exercise
their sovereign powers, rather than simply authorizing access barriers
or discriminatory surcharges.Y In New York v. United States,"s
the Court struck down a provision of a federal law forcing states to
choose between siting (or joining a regional state compact that has
sited) a low-level radioactive waste disposal facility or taking title to
all low-level radioactive waste generated within its borders. Either
choice would, according to the Court, " 'commandeer' state
governments into the service of federal regulatory purposes."'" By
requiring states to become liable for generators' damages or by
requiring states to implement federal legislation, Congress was
regulating the states. This violated the structure of our constitutional
government, which, in order to preserve the authority of states, allows
only for the national government to act directly upon the citizens. 6
Nevertheless, the Court in New York v. United States indicated that

181. See, e.g., Impact of FederalSolid Waste Legislation: Hearingbefore the Subcomm.
on Environment and Employment of the House Comm. on Small Business, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. 84 (1991) (statement of Mary Sue Terry, Attorney General of Virginia) (contending
that disposal operator's ability to raise Commerce Clause issues complicates routine
environmental enforcement suits and that inability to control flow of out-of-state waste
hampers long range solid waste planning); Interstate Transportation of Solid Waste:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Transp. and Hazardous Materials, Comm. on Energy
and Commercs, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1991) (statement of Hon. Thomas C. Sawyer)
(indicating unregulated interstate shipments of waste contribute to failures to detect
potentially hazardous, illegal waste shipments).
182. But cf.id. at 202-08 (statement of David S. Bailey, Senior Scientist, Environmental
Defense Fund) (arguing that state inability to control solid waste flow is problematic
because states use lack of control to justify their failure to address in-state waste disposal
issues).
183. New York v. United States, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 2427-29 (1992); see also Federal
Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 787 (1982) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that federal regulation
requiring substantial state government participation may violate federalism notions in the
Constitution); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288
(1981) (upholding federal regulation of strip mining as not violative of state sovereignty).
184. 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
185. Id. at 2428.
186. Id. at 2421.
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congressional authorization of state surcharges on and access barriers
to waste generated out-of-state would not pose a Tenth Amendment
problem because any resulting burdens of such a law will fall "on
those who generate waste and find no outlet for its disposal, rather
Consequently, the Tenth
than on the State as a sovereign."'"
Amendment allows Congress to authorize state access barriers and
surcharges upon out-of-state waste, but not to impose mandatory
regulatory obligations upon exporting or importing states.
In sum, should a national solution to the problem of interstate
transportation of solid waste demand the expenditure of resources,
Congress's solution, for both practical and Tenth Amendment reasons,
must allow for a minimum of state autonomy.
D. Equity or Fairness
To many critics of the interstate waste trade, the primary value
at stake is not economic efficiency, environmental protection, or state
autonomy, but equity. These critics charge that it is unfair that
communities in some states can dump their trash in communities
located in other states, potentially turning recipient states into
Consequently, any congressional
national dumping grounds1 8
decision over how waste should be distributed must incorporate
considerations of equity, or fairness. Equity is subject to several
definitions, some of which condemn the national market as a means
of distributing waste and some of which do not. The following section
discusses whether the unrestricted national waste market would be
considered more or less fair than a market restricted by state
regulation as evaluated under four interpretations of justice or fairness:"8 9 utilitarianism, Aristotle's principle of proportional equality,

187. Id. at 2427 (referring to provisions of Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act
Amendments of 1985 authorizing sited states in regional compacts to impose compensatory
and penalty surcharges upon, and to ultimately deny access to, the disposal of waste
generated within states that fail to comply with Act's siting deadlines).
188. See, e.g., Oregon Waste Sys. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 112 S. Ct. 1345,1357
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Janet C. Pancoast & Leonidas W. Payne, Hazardous
Waste in InterstateCommerce: Triumph of Law over Logic, 20 ECOLOGY L.Q. 817,825-28
(1993) (noting that "a number of states believe they are serving as dumping grounds for
other states" with respect to hazardous waste disposal).
189. For excellent analyses of the fairness of a similar distribution problem, see Vicki
Been, What's Fairness Got to Do with It? EnvironmentalJusticeand the Siting of Locally
Undesirable Land Uses, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 1001 (1993) (discussing fairness in the
distribution of locally unwanted land uses); Michael Enbar, Equity in the Social Sciences,
in EQUrrY ISSUES INRADIOACrIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT 3 (Roger E. Kasperson ed.,
1983) (analyzing fairness in the distribution of radioactive waste sites); Michael B. Gerrard,
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an extension of John Rawls's "difference principle," and the theory
of compensatory justice."9
1. Utilitarianism
Under classical utilitarianism's "principle of utility," social
institutions serve just purposes when they maximize utility for the
greatest number of persons."'

"Utility" has been described as

happiness"9 or as preference satisfaction. 3 The principle of
utility holds that if a change maximizes the total utility for society as
a whole, the change should be made even if the utility of some
individuals decreases. 4 Act utilitarianism uses the principle of
utility (the greatest good for the greatest number) to choose between

various actions.9" Rule utilitarianism, on the other hand, applies
the principle of utility to choose between various rules or practices
that will guide future social actions. 6
An attempt to apply the principle of utility to the problem of
interstate commerce in waste reveals why act utilitarianism has fallen
into disrepute: It is impossible to determine the greatest utility
without having a means to compare varying levels of satisfaction
among different individuals."97 We may assume that at least some
residents of net waste-importing states would be satisfied if Congress
authorized state import bans and dissatisfied if Congress did nothing,

Fear and Loathing in the Siting of Hazardous and Radioactive Waste Facilities: A
ComprehensiveApproach to a Misperceived Crisis, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1047, 1122-32 (1994)
(discussing fairness in the distribution of hazardous and radioactive waste disposal
facilities).
190. This is by no means intended to be an exhaustive list of criteria by which the
fairness of the distribution of waste can be analyzed. For instance, the following does not
discuss theories based upon a conception of freedom from environmental harm as a human
right because of the difficulty in applying such theories to waste disposal where everyone
generates at least some waste. See, e.g., Dinah Shelton, Human Rights, Environmental
Rights, and the Right to Environment, 28 STAN. J. INT'L L. 103 (1991) (suggesting that a
"right" to a healthy environment is developing in international law). See generally
Symposium, Earth Rights and Responsibilities: Human Rights and Environmental
Protection,18 YALE J. INT'L L. 215 (1993) (surveying the interrelation of human rights and
environmental concerns).
191. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION 34-35 (Mary Warwick ed., Meridian Books 1962) (1789).

192. Id.
193. For a discussion of the distinction between happiness and preference satisfaction,
see PETER S. WENz, ENvIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 160-61 (1988).
194. JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 76 (1984).
195. Id. at 106 n.9.
196. See id. at 76-77.
197. See H. PEYTON YOUNG, EQUITY IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 10 (1994).
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leaving the national market in place. Similarly, it is safe to assume
that residents of net waste-exporting states would rank their preferences in precisely the reverse order. But without knowledge of how
much each resident of importing and exporting states is satisfied or
dissatisfied by the two options, it is impossible to go beyond this point
to predict which alternative would achieve the greatest good for the
greatest number of people. Resident satisfaction may be consistent
with the extent to which the resident's state imports or exports waste,
with residents of major net importing states the most dissatisfied and
those of major net exporting states the most satisfied with the national
market. If this were the case, residents of major net importing states
would despise the national market while residents of a minor net
exporting state may merely dislike the state import ban. However,
this may not be the case. Resident satisfaction may be shaped by a
multitude of other factors, such as the population's prior experiences
with waste disposal facilities, the importance of waste disposal
operations to the state or local economy, and the size of any host fees
collected by the communities in which facilities are located. All of
these factors make it impossible to predict, based only upon statistics
showing which states are net waste importers or exporters, whether
the national market or the imposition of state barriers maximizes
social satisfaction.
We are in no better position to predict the outcome of the
application of rule utilitarianism. On the one hand, a rule utilitarian
might decide that total societal satisfaction is maximized when
everyone has the right to ship waste for disposal out-of-state,
regardless of whether it is exercised or not. Support for such a rule
might be found in the majority opinion in Philqdelphiav. New Jersey,
in which Justice Stewart indicated that the national market in waste
disposal functioned as a sort of insurance scheme on landfill space and
might work to the future benefit of even those states that currently
imported waste.""8 On the other hand, a rule utilitarian might
decide that total societal happiness is maximized when people are
assured that the residents of some states will not be made to accept
the waste generated in other states. Without knowledge of the utility
function of residents of each state, we have no way of knowing which
rule would best maximize societal satisfaction.

198. 437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978).

1995]

NATIONAL MARKET IN SOLID WASTE

1529

2. Proportional Equality
Aristotle maintained that there are two kinds of justice:
distributive justice and compensatory justice. Distributive justice is
exercised by the legislator in allotting honor, wealth, property, and
"other divisible assets of the community," while compensatory or
corrective justice is exercised by the judge in settling disputes."l
Aristotle proposed a theory of distributive justice based on proportional equality.2' Proportional equality demands that the legislator
distribute shares of honor, wealth, and community goods according to
each person's share of merit or desert, however defined2' With
respect to solid waste, the issue is not the size of the individual's share
of social goods, but rather the size of the individual's share of
environmental "bads"-solid waste. It makes sense to distribute solid
waste, or, more accurately, the burdens of waste generation, according
to the amount of benefits received from waste production.'
The
benefits of waste generation are generally the benefits of our
consumer-oriented economy (e.g., food packaging that preserves the
freshness of the contents or saves time in preparation), in addition to
the benefits received by the state or locality as a result of the waste
disposal operation itself (e.g., host fees, jobs). The burdens of waste
generation are those that accompany the disposal of waste-increased
health risks, increased regulatory costs, property and natural resource
losses, and potential demoralization costs. According to Aristotle's

199. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 267 (Harrison Rackham trans., 1982).

200. Id. at 273. As Aristotle described it,
[t]he just in this sense is therefore the proportionate, and the unjust is that which
violates proportion. The unjust may therefore be either too much or too little;
and this is what we find in fact, for when injustice is done, the doer has too much
and the sufferer too little of the good in question.
Id.; see also PETER WESTEN, SPEAKING OF EQUALITY 54-56 (1990) (outlining the six steps
of Aristotle's analysis of the relationship between justice and proportional equality);
YOUNG, supra note 197, at 9 (recognizing Aristotle's equity principle as a theory of justice
"which states that goods should be divided in proportion to each claimant's contribution").
201. ARISTOTLE, supra note 199, at 269 ("All are agreed that justice in distributions
must be based on desert of some sort, although they do not all mean the same sort of
desert; democrats make the criterion free birth; those of oligarchical sympathies wealth.
...);see also WESTEN, supra note 200, at 56-57 (pointing out Aristotle's recognition of
the different standards for measuring merit).
202. Roger E. Kasperson & Barry L. Rubin, Siting a Radioactive Waste Repository:
What Role for Equity? in EQUrrY ISSUES IN RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT, supra
note 105, at 127-32 (noting that the benefits of radioactive waste are those resulting from
the generation of electricity while the burdens are those related to the disposal of
radioactive waste).
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conception of proportional equality, each person's share of waste
generation burdens should be in proportion to each person's share of
waste generation benefits.'
There are at least two potential distributions of waste that would
achieve proportional equality in the distribution of the burdens and
benefits of waste production. Under the first, a person's waste
burdens are deemed proportional to her waste benefits when the total
amount of burden she sustains is equal to the total amount of benefit
she receives as a result of her consumer purchasing decisions and
consumptive habits. An individual's benefits and burdens are
proportional, in other words, when they reflect the individual's
consumptive patterns. The following discussion will refer to this
method of measuring proportional equality as "benefit/burden
concordance."'
Under the second distribution, each person
receives equal shares of the nation's total waste burden and equal
shares of the nation's total waste benefits, or the total amount of
benefits derived from waste by society as a whole. The following
discussion will refer to this distribution as "benefit/burden equalization."'
Under the "benefit/burden equalization" formula,
proportional equality reflects interpersonal equality. There is no
relationship between the individual's own purchasing decisions and
her share of the burdens and benefits. Instead, the goal is for the
individual to receive no more and no less of society's waste burdens
and benefits than anyone else.
(a) Benefit/Burden Concordance
Only the state import ban option will assure achievement of the
proportional equality demanded by the benefit/burden concordance
principle. Under this definition of proportional equality, each
individual's share of benefits will be in proportion to that of every
other and so too will be each individual's share of burdens. If it is
203. The principle that the risks of physical harm from collective social endeavors
should be distributed equally is held by many political philosophers. See GEORGE
KLOSKO, THE PRINCIPLE OF FAIRNESS AND POLITICAL OBLIGATION 34 (1992) (arguing
that each individual ought to take his or her equal share of the burdens associated with
the benefits of cooperative activities); Richard L. Abel, A Socialist Approach to Risk, 41
MD. L. REv. 695, 710-11 (1982) (arguing that "those risks we collectively choose to
encounter ought to be shared equally").
204. Roger E. Kasperson et al., Confronting Equity in Radioactive Waste Management.
Modest Proposalsfor a Socially Just and Acceptable Program, in EQUITY ISSUES IN
RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT, supra note 105, at 335 (applying benefit/burden
concordance principle to distribution of radioactive waste).
205. Id.
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assumed that the state import ban option will lead to all waste being
disposed of in the state in which it is generated, each state's residents
will experience both the burdens and the benefits of the waste they
collectively produce as a result of their consumptive habits. Thus, on
the state level, state import bans achieve proportionality between the
burdens and benefits of waste generation. In all cases, the benefits of
waste generation to each state's citizens will be commensurate with
the burdens from waste disposal. It is immaterial what the sizes of
those benefits and burdens are. The important point is that the two
are correlated: If state residents produce more waste, their benefits
go up, but so too will their burdens. Similarly, if state residents
produce less waste, their benefits go down, but so too will their
burdens.
By contrast, the national market option is inimical to the type of
proportional equality demanded by the concordance principle. Under
the national market, residents can increase their benefits by making
consumptive decisions that produce more waste, but lower the amount
of burdens that otherwise correspond to that amount of benefit by
exporting excess waste. Similarly, when waste is distributed through
a national market, the residents of net-importing states may end up
with greater burdens than those for which they would otherwise be
responsible, given their consumptive decisions. Either way, the
principle of proportionality is destroyed. Only where a state's waste
imports happen to equal its waste exports will the national market
achieve proportional equality according to the concordance principle.
According to the benefit/burden concordance principle of equality,
therefore, the national market is generally an inequitable mechanism
for distributing waste, and the state import ban is generally an
equitable mechanism.
(b) Benefit/Burden Equalization
(i) The Relativity of the Burdens of Increased
Volumes of Waste
Using the "burden equalization" principle instead of the
concordance principle, the fairness of the two options for distributing
waste is not quite so readily determined. The analysis falls victim to
an inherent problem with Aristotle's principle: the difficulty of
determining how to account for differences between things that could
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affect the magnitude of the burden or benefit bestowed."s With
respect to waste, the problem manifests itself when one attempts to
compare the burden and benefit of the distribution of a particular
volume of waste between states that differ in ways that could affect
the magnitude of those burdens and benefits. This comparison is
necessary because that principle demands that we determine whether
the waste volumes requiring disposal in various states as a result of
the functioning of a particular waste-distributing mechanism result in
equal or unequal shares of burdens.
Assuming that waste-importing and waste-exporting states were
similar in all respects relevant to the burden of waste disposal, this
measurement problem would not matter. Furthermore, this assumption leads to the assumption that only the state import ban
approach would equalize the benefits and burdens of waste disposal.
To see this, we can compare the average per capita "waste burden"
of the residents of each state under both the national market and the
state import ban option to arrive at a rough measure by which to
compare certain costs associated with waste disposal, such as the
magnitude of each resident's share of the state's regulatory costs.
Under the state import ban approach, the per capita "waste burden"
of all state residents will be equal. Assuming each person generates
four pounds of garbage a day, the per capita waste burden will simply
be four pounds per person per day, or 0.73 tons per year.2°7 Under
this same assumption, the national free market option will yield
unequal shares of burdens. Within waste-exporting states, the per
capita burden will drop, while within waste-importing states, the per
capita levels will rise. For example, after volumes of waste imported
and exported are taken into consideration, the per capita waste
burden of residents in New Jersey drops from 0.73 to 0.40 tons per

206. Hans Kelsen noted:
If the individuals A and B are equal, the rights to be allotted to them must be
equal too. However, there are in nature no two individuals who are really equal,
since there is always a difference as to age, sex, race, health, wealth, and so forth.
...
The decisive question as to social equality is: Which differences are
irrelevant? To this question Aristotle's mathematical formula of distributive
justice has no answer.
HANS KELSEN, Aristotle's Doctrine of Justice, in WHAT ISJuSTICE? JUSTICE, LAW, AND
POLITICS IN THE MIRROR OF SCIENCE 127 (1957); see also W. VON LEYDEN, ARISTOTLE
ON EQUALITY AND JUSTICE 26-29 (1985) (explaining attempts to justify notions of equality
in systems with extreme diversity).
207. See supra note 56.
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year, while the per capita waste burden in West Virginia rises from
0.73 to 1.17 tons per year.
Waste-importing and waste-exporting states, differ, however, in
a few key measures.

For instance, waste-importing states are

generally larger and have lower population densities. Similarly, even
after waste imports and exports are taken into account, waste-

importing states have lower average amounts of waste requiring
disposal per square mile of land than do waste-exporting states.
Furthermore, the populations of importing and exporting states also
differ as to average income levels2" and the magnitude of pollution
burdens other than waste disposal.2 10

Arguably, each of these

differences is relevant to determining whether the burden of 1.17 tons
of waste per capita really constitutes a greater burden than 0.40 tons
of waste per person. The following section explores how each of
these differences could be argued to render more equal the differing

per capita waste burdens resulting from distributing waste through the
national market and render less equal the otherwise identical per
capita waste burdens distributed by the state import ban approach.2 '

208. See infra Appendix, Table 3. Of course, these "burden" figures must be reduced
by any benefits the state receives from the business of disposing of waste. The
unpredictability of such benefits, however, makes them difficult to factor into the analysis
with any certainty. See infra notes 246-51 and accompanying text.
209. See infra Appendix, Table 1.
210. See infra Appendix, Table 1.
211. The following omits any consideration of differences in individuals that could affect
the degree of harm an individual sustains as a result of the health risks from waste
disposal. For physiological reasons, some population subgroups-for example, asthmatics,
pregnant women, and young children-are more susceptible- to health harm from lower
levels of exposure to toxic chemicals. See, e.g., Environmental Protection Agency, National
Primary and Secondary Ambient Air Quality Standards for Lead, 43 Fed. Reg. 46,246,
46,252 (1978) (concluding that young children are at particular risk from lead exposure
because of greater physiological sensitivity and greater physical exposure). Furthermore,
even where physiological differences are missing, persons vary in their aversion to environmental risks. For example, it is well known that one's culture and beliefs can influence
their reaction to a given health risk. See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS
CIRCLE: TowARD EFFECrIVE RISK REGULATION 16 (1993); MARY DOUGLAS & AARON
WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE 14 (1982) ("[E]ach culture, each set of shared values
and supporting social institutions, is biased toward highlighting certain risks and
downplaying others"); Paul Slovic, Perceptionof Risk, 236 SCIENCE 280,283 (1987). It has
also been shown that people who work or live in industries or communities with higher
risks are often more accepting of health risks. See, e.g., Gerrard, supra note 189, at 114950 (describing local cultures in the United States that are strongly accepting of the
hazardous and radioactive waste facilities that form the basis of their economy).
Nevertheless, these differences are relevant to the present analysis only if they manifest
themselves as differences between importing and exporting states. There is no particular
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(ii) FactorsInfluencing the Equality of Waste Burden
(1) Population and Waste Density
The health and regulatory costs of waste disposal should vary
with the population and waste density of the state. Population density
will dictate how near or far from populated areas a disposal facility
can be placed. This will affect the magnitude of public expenditures
on health risks, the costs of siting a facility, and the total volume of
waste generated by the state's population alone. Waste density
gauges both the total amount of waste requiring disposal in the state
and the area over which it can be spread. Persons living in states with
lower waste densities are statistically less likely to live near a waste
disposal2 facility than persons living in states with high waste den21
sities.
Data on state imports and exports demonstrate that waste flows
from states with higher population densities to states with lower
population densities. 213 The data also show that, even after the
volumes of waste exported are taken into account, waste-importing
states have lower waste densities than waste-exporting states. 214 If
these differences are considered, it could be argued that, rather than

reason to believe that individuals living in waste-importing states will, as a general rule,
be more or less susceptible to health risks than persons living in waste-exporting states.
212. The statistical nature of this assumption must be stressed. Although the lack of
data on the actual distribution of waste disposal facilities leaves no choice but to resort to
such an assumption, it is important to recognize that the probabilities of an individual
living near a waste disposal facility can vary widely according to a host of other factors.
Studies have shown that persons living in a predominantly poor and minority area are
more likely to live nearby polluting land uses, including solid waste disposal facilities. For
studies of the disproportionate siting of solid waste disposal facilities, see Robert D.
Bullard, Solid Waste and the Houston Black Community, 53 Soc. INQUIRY 273 (1983)
(concluding that solid waste disposal facilities in Houston are located disproportionately
in minority neighborhoods); Robert D. Bullard & Beverly Hendrix Wright, The Politics
of Pollution: Implicationsfor the Black Community, 47 PHYLON 71, 76 (1986) (noting that
six of Houston's eight garbage incinerators and all five of the City's landfills are located
in African-American neighborhoods). For studies of the disproportionate siting of
hazardous waste disposal facilities and other polluting land uses, see U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SITING OF HAZARDOUS WASTE LANDFILLS AND THEIR CORRELATION WITH RACIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF SURROUNDING COMMUNITIES
(1983); UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST COMM'N FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, ToxIc WASTE AND
RACE IN THE UNITED STATES (1987); U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
REPORT ON ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY (1992); BULLARD, supra note 12 at 1-6.

213. See infra Appendix, Table 1.
214. See infra Appendix, Table 1.
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being equal between the residents of waste-importing and wasteexporting states, under the state import ban approach, the per capita
waste burden of importing states is actually lower. Similarly, these
data could also be used to argue that the per capita waste burdens of
waste-importing and waste-exporting state residents under the
national market approach are less unequal than the per capita waste
burden figures actually show. This has a measure of common sense
behind it as well. Although Montana may be a net waste-importing
state, having only 5.7 persons per square mile, Montana has the
luxury to site its landfills away from people; Massachusetts, a net
waste-exporting state with nearly 6,000 persons per square mile, does
not.215
In response to this argument, however, it could be claimed that
an individual is entitled to whatever benefits flow from the
demographic and geographic characteristics of the individual's state
of residence. Thus, the fact that one's state of residence has a low
population density and a large land area and, hence, lower health and
financial costs associated with waste disposal, should not be employed
to mitigate the individual costs from increased waste. Popular
conceptions of the basis of individual entitlements to be free of
pollution risks are often based on the idea that a person is entitled to
limit his or her share of pollution harm to that present in the locality
in which the individual lives. 216 But justification for this entitlement
is difficult to discern. If one's place of residence is determined
through happenstance, as by birth, its characteristics that affect
individual health risk from pollution would seem to be, much like
natural talents, "arbitrary from a moral point of view."217

215. See infra Appendix, Table 3.
216. See, e.g., Interstate Transportationof Solid Waste, supra note 44, at 38 (statement
of Hon. Wayne Owens, Congressman from Utah) ("The people of Utah don't want
everybody else's refuse and there is very strong revulsion. We don't mind taking care of
our share of our own waste, but we want, Mr. Chairman, to be able to control our own
destiny."); Interstate Transportationof Solid Waste PartII, HearingBefore the Subcomm.
on Antitrust,Impact ofDeregulation,and Ecology, of the House Comm. on Small Business,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1991) (statement of Marie Burleson, Club 3000) (stating with
respect to interstate waste shipments to her rural Ohio town from populated East Coast
cities, "[j]ust because we live in a rural area does not mean that we have less rights than
those who live in cities").
217. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JusTicE 15 (1971) (arguing that a conception of
justice should nullify the accidents of natural endowments and social circumstance as bases
for political and economic advantage because they are undeserved and hence "arbitrary
from a moral point of view"). But cf. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA
213-31 (1974) (arguing that ignoring natural talents denigrates a person's autonomy,
enslaves the better endowed to the lesser endowed, and rests upon the erroneous premise
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It can perhaps be argued that one is entitled to the lower risks of
one's place of residence when sacrifices are made to settle there.
Suppose a person willingly moves from a densely populated state with
greater job and cultural opportunities to one with less of these
opportunities, in order to take advantage of the greater environmental
amenities of the second state, including lower probability of harm
from waste disposal. Regarding as "fair" the exportation of waste
from the densely populated state to the less densely populated state
because it "evens up" the per capita waste burdens of residents in the
two states justifies depriving this person of the benefits of her
sacrifices in moving away from the high-density state. This latter
argument assumes, however, that people usually control their
Data on interstate migration
destinations when they move.
demonstrate, however, that in perhaps a third or more of the total
cases of interstate migration, the persons moving had little or no
control over their destinations. In these cases, job transfers or family
reasons compelled the moves. 218 Consequently, it is better to
consider factors concerning location when determining equality in the
distribution of the burdens of waste disposed. Those factors lessen
the resulting equalities in per capita waste levels under the state
import ban approach. At the same time, the factors lessen the
inequalities in per capita waste levels resulting from the national
market approach.
(2) Per Capita Income
Low income levels arguably increase the individual burdens
attributable to waste disposal. Lower income levels make it more
difficult for an individual to move away from a locality to avoid a
health hazard. Localities where the residents' incomes are low will
have less money to spend on measures such as monitoring a waste
disposal facility or providing services should contamination occur.
Currently, the average per capita incomes in waste-importing states

that all entitlements must be deserved).
218. LARRY LONG, MIGRATION AND RESIDENTIAL MOBILITY IN THE UNITED STATES
235-36 (1988). Data gathered from the Census Bureau's Annual Housing Surveys of 1979,
1980, and 1981 shows that approximately 22% of household interstate relocations between
1979 and 1981 were due to job transfers, and 8.6% were for the purpose of moving closer
to relatives. Id. In neither the situation ofjob transfers nor moves to be near family does
the individual have much choice over his or her location. Only 6% of those surveyed
reported that they moved because of a change of climate. Id.
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are lower than those in waste-exporting states.219 This factor
supports the argument that, despite the lower population and waste
densities of waste-importing states, the inequality in income between
importer and exporter states renders the residents of importer and
exporter states just as bad off under the national market approach.
(3) Burdens From the Production Process
A comparison of the relative burdens resulting from different
mechanisms for distributing waste might need to take into consideration the distribution of health and financial burdens resulting
from the production process. For example, the conclusion that
individuals in waste-importing states have higher burdens associated
with waste disposal arguably would be undermined if it were also
found that they have lower burdens associated with other forms of
pollution.
Suppose there are several paper mills in State X, each of which
discharges dioxin-contaminated wastewater into the State's rivers and
streams and particulates into the air, but that there are no paper mills
in State Y Suppose also that there are several solid waste disposal
facilities in State Y, but none in State X. Finally, suppose that the
paper produced in X's paper mill is distributed and purchased in both
State X and State Y, but that, once it is discarded, it ends up in State
Y's landfills. While only the residents of State Y face the hazards and
regulatory costs of the disposal of paper, they are free of other
hazards associated with paper production, such as dioxin-contaminated water and particulate-polluted air. If the distribution of the
burdens of the production process are considered along with the
burdens of waste disposal, the residents of State Y may not shoulder
greater burdens than the residents of State X. While the residents of
Y alone shoulder the burdens of waste disposal, they share none of
the burdens of producing paper. The example suggests that focusing
solely on the burdens of waste disposal fails to give a true picture of
the burdens to which a given state's population might be subject.
While examination of per capita waste burdens alone demonstrates
that only the state import ban approach equalizes the burdens of
waste disposal, perhaps if other factors-such as the pollution burdens
from the production process-were taken into account, the national

219. See infra Appendix, Table 1.
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market approach may also equalize the burdens between wasteimporting and exporting states.
This argument may be countered statistic by statistic. For
example, available data on air pollution emissions by state indicate
that waste-importing states on average have higher emissions of air
pollution than waste-exporting states."
This shows that the
distribution of air pollution tends to track the distribution of solid
waste that travels in interstate commerce and thus should not disturb
the conclusions reached with regard to waste alone. On the other
hand, it is not clear that this is the case with respect to water
pollution, 1 and thus the statistic-to-statistic approach does not go
very far toward resolving the issue. A similar fact-based approach
might suggest that waste disposal facilities bring fewer benefits to a
community than a polluting production facility, and thus higher waste
disposal burdens are not offset by lower production facility pollution
burdens. In comparison to the hundreds of jobs that might be created
by a manufacturer, waste disposal facilities create comparatively few
jobs.m
Even if such statistics eliminate the argument that the distribution
of production burdens offsets the distribution of waste disposal
burdens, the real threat of the production burden argument is that it
points to the potential irrelevance of conclusions regarding the
distribution of waste burdens alone. Even if waste-importing states
sustain higher burdens from waste disposal, perhaps waste-exporting
states sustain higher burdens attributable to poorer education, child
care, or police protection. The list of relevant social burdens whose
distribution could be considered is endless.
There is no wholly satisfactory reply to the so-called "aggregation
objection," 2" other than that it can cripple any attempt to ensure
the fair distribution of a particular harm. 4 A pragmatist would
exclude consideration of the distribution of all burdens that do not
220. See infra Appendix, Table 1.
221. See infra Appendix, Table 1 (showing that distribution of water pollution between
waste-importing and waste-exporting states is not statistically significant).
222. See Gerrard, supranote 189, at 1147 (noting that off-site hazardous and radioactive
waste disposal facilities create few jobs and giving samples of hazardous waste incinerators
that employed 94 and 104 people respectively).
223. See Been, supra note 189, at 1024 ("The aggregation objection asks why the
burden of [a particular social harm] should be viewed in isolation, without giving
consideration to other burdens and benefits that neighborhoods suffer and enjoy."); see
also BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SoCIAL JuSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 242-46 (1980)
(further explaining the aggregation in reference to a complex society).
224. See Been, supra note 189, at 1025.
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directly enlarge or shrink the burdens of waste disposal in order to at
least pin down the relative distribution of the burdens of waste, while
others might abandon the whole enterprise of trying to measure
equity according to a benefit/burden equalization principle.
(4) Potential Environmental Offsetting Benefits of Increased
Waste Volumes
As the recent rash of flow control ordinances demonstrates,2
a greater volume of waste is not always ultimately undesirable.'
Increased volumes of waste can make larger waste disposal or
processing operations economically feasible. Because such benefits
arguably offset some of the burdens of larger per capita waste levels,
they should be taken into consideration when assessing the
distribution of burdens between waste-importing and waste-exporting
states. Newer, larger facilities tend to have better environmental
compliance records and hence pose lower health and regulatory
enforcement costs. 7 Although these facilities could bring greater
health and environmental harm should contamination occur," they
should also have greater financial means to insure against such risks.
The presence of interested insurers adds a second layer of oversight
of the facility's environmental integrity as well as providing a source
of compensation that might not be available to smaller facilities.
Furthermore, because larger facilities can take advantage of
economies of scale, they should reduce the costs of waste disposal to
residents in waste-importing states. Finally, many private waste
disposal operators pay the communities "host fees" in order to offset
the environmental, health, and nuisance costs of their facilities.

225. See NATIONAL SOLID WASTES MANAGEMENT ASS'N, supra note 48, at 7.
226. See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 114 S. Ct. 1677, 1680 (1994);
KOVAcS & PELLEGRINI, supra note 93, at 115.
227. See Interstate Transportation of Solid Waste, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Antitrus4 Impact of Deregulation,andPrivatizationof the Comm. on Small Business,101st
Cong., 1st Sess. 232 (1989) (comments by Waste Management, Inc.) ("The modem landfill
is typically much larger with state of the art management controls designed to virtually
eliminate the environmental problems historically associated with municipal landfills.").
See also Municipal Solid Waste Disposal Crisis,supra note 166, at 235 (statement of W.
Allen Moore, President, National Solid Wastes Management Association) (predicting
newer, state-of-the-art facilities serving larger waste generation areas will be more
environmentally protective in design and operation).
228. Id. at 320 (statement of Velma Smith, Friends of the Earth).
229. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 258.70-.74 (1993) (requiring all municipal solid waste landfills to

have financial assurance).
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Nevertheless there is a major catch to the ability of the importing
state to reap these benefits.O0 Under free market conditions, the
NIMBY syndrome is accentuated because the state or locality cannot
keep the benefits of the waste disposal facility. Residents who would
host a facility for their exclusive use are less willing to host a facility
that will be used by nonresidents. Building new facilities at the
present time is therefore extremely difficult. Moreover, the amount
of host fees offered and whether they are offered at all vary
widely."' Thus, although these benefits exist, because they are
unreliable it would be inaccurate to assume that they are always
available to offset the larger per capita waste burdens of residents of
waste-importing states.
(iii) Application of Factor
The impact of such factors on the burdens of waste disposal is
too indeterminate to allow any accurate prediction as to whether the
distribution of waste according to the national market or according to
state import bans will lead to an equalization of the benefits and
burdens of waste disposal between waste-importing and wasteexporting states. Looking only at per capita waste burdens, the state
import ban approach appears to equalize the burdens of waste
disposal, while the national market approach appears to render these
burdens unequal. However, if differences in population and average
waste density between waste-importing and waste-exporting states are
taken into account, this conclusion becomes harder to support. The
distribution of waste and population densities tends to make
distribution of waste burdens under the national free market more
equal, and the distribution of waste burdens according to state-sized
markets less equal. Although the lower incomes of waste-importing
states could return us to the conclusion that the state import ban
approach is more equitable, inclusion of other factors, such as the
distribution of the burdens of the production process (as well as other
societal burdens), could undermine this conclusion again. Regardless
of whether one considers the potential offsetting beneficial effect of
increased waste volumes on the possibility of building safer disposal
facilities in waste-importing states, the exercise of weighing burdens
and benefits of waste disposal, at least at this stage of data analysis,
is far too speculative to make any clear predictions as to the
230. See infra notes 245-50 and accompanying text.
231. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. For a full discussion of host fees and
possible objections to them, see infra notes 246-51 and accompanying text.
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equalization of the distribution of waste burdens under the state
import ban and national market approaches.
Rawls's Difference Principle
An alternative approach to evaluating the fairness of the
mechanism by which waste is distributed is suggested by John Rawls's
difference principle. In an effort to articulate basic rules that would
constitute a just structure of society superior to that called for by
utilitarianism, John Rawls constructed a theory of social justice
consisting of two principles.' 2 Although Rawls intended for his
theory of justice, including the two principles, to apply only to the
basic structure of society and not to distributions of particular goods
or services," it has proved so useful in determining the fairness of
distributions that it is frequently employed to critique the justice of
Thus the following must be read with the caveat
policy choices'
that it is an extension of Rawls's original theory.
Under Rawls's first principle, the Principle of Greatest Equal
Liberty, each person is entitled to "an equal right to the most
extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a
similar system of liberty for all."" 5 Some have argued that freedom
from risk "is one of the most basic of liberties." 6 Others have
argued, however, that because both the freedom from risks produced
by others and the right to impose risks upon others could be
considered basic liberties, Rawls's first principle is internally inconsis3.

232. RAWLs, supra note 217, at 15, 60, Rawls defines the basic structure of society to
include the political constitution and major economic and social arrangements. Id. at 7.
Rawls includes competitive markets among the examples given. Other examples are the
legal protection of freedom of thought and liberty of conscience, private ownership of the
means of production, and the family. Id.
233. Id. at 87-88. He wrote:
It is a mistake to focus attention on the varying relative positions of individuals
and to require that every change, considered as a single transaction viewed in
isolation, be in itself just. It is the arrangement of the basic structure which is to
be judged, and judged from a general point of view.

Id.
234. See

MARY R. ENGLISH, SITING LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL

FACILITIES 132-35 (1992) (applying Rawls's conception of procedural justice to the process
of selecting a site for a low-level radioactive waste disposal facility); SUSAN MOLLER OKIN,
JUSTICE, GENDER AND THE FAMILY 101-09 (1989) (employing Rawls's Original Position
to frame an account of justice between men and women in the family); Been, supra note
189, at 1048 (using Rawls's difference principle in the micro sense, though conceding that
this was not the sense in which Rawls intended it to be used).
235. RAWLS, supra note 217, at 302.
236. See Abel, supra note 203, at 711.
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tent.27 Although the liberty to be free of out-of-state waste and the
liberty to dispose of one's waste in another state can perhaps be
distinguished from the liberty to be free of risk and the liberty to
impose risk, the force of this critique, as well as the greater applicability of Rawls's second principle to interstate waste issues,
warrants limiting this discussion to Rawls's second principle.
Under Rawls's second principle, any social or economic inequality in the basic structure of society must be arranged so that it
works to the benefit of the least advantaged 2 8 Rawls does not
require that inequalities be eliminated, but only that they be arranged
to benefit a representative of society's lowest class,' 9 or the "lowest
representative" person.240 This person represents the average
person in society's worst-off class of persons. Although the difference
principle most naturally applies to the creation of new jobs to which
economic rewards are attached, the principle applies by definition to
any basic feature of society that results in unequal shares of primary
social goods such as income and wealth.24 Because the distribution
of waste disposal affects income and wealth, Rawls's principle can be
applied to the question of how society should distribute the solid
waste it generates.
Where the distribution of solid waste is concerned, our potential
lowest representative person is actually two persons, both of whom
are easily identified. The first is a member of the lowest class of
persons in a net-importer state. If the importation of waste causes no
changes other than an increase in the importing state's waste load,
this first person would be made worse off in an unrestricted market
and would be no better off than she was initially in a restricted
market. In contrast, our other lowest representative person, a
237. See Joel Feinberg, Justice, Fairnessand Rationality, 81 YALE L.. 1004, 1019-20
(1972) (describing how applying a general principle can lead to a judgment counter to a
firmly held conviction); Christopher H. Schroeder, Rights Against Risks, 86 COLUM. L.
REV. 495, 539 (1986) (arguing Rawls's liberty principle is satisfied by granting individuals
an absolute right to pursue any risk-creating activity as well as an absolute right to be free
of risk).
238. RAWLS, supra note 217, at 302 (1971) ("Social and economic inequalities are to
be arranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged,
consistent with the just savings principle, and (b) attached to offices and positions open
to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.").
239. Id. at 95.
240. Id. at 98.
241. T.M. Scanlon, Rawls' Theory of Justice, in READING RAWLS 169, 192 (Norman
Daniels ed., 1975). Rawls defines primary social goods as "rights and liberties, powers and
opportunities, income and wealth," or more generally, "things that every rational man is
presumed to want." RAWLS, supra note 217, at 62.
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resident of a net-exporter state, would react in precisely the opposite
manner to the choice between a restricted and an unrestricted market.
Living in a more densely populated state, this second individual
suffers from a greater likelihood of residing near a waste disposal
facility prior to the occurrence of any waste exportation. She will,
therefore, be made better off in an unrestricted market where in-state
waste can be exported. Her lot will not change in a restricted market.
Assuming static conditions where waste exportation and
importation simply shifts waste from one state to another, according
to Rawls's difference principle, neither a restricted nor an unrestricted
market is any more just than the other. While both render a class of
lowest representative persons better off, they do so only by making
another class of lowest representative persons worse off. Rawls's
difference principle will find one distributive scheme more just than
another only where the scheme has the capacity to make at least one
class of lowest representative persons better off without making
another lowest representative class worse off.
Between the two alternatives of a restricted and an unrestricted
market, the restricted market has a better chance of fulfilling this
condition. Assuming that residents of all states will reduce the waste
they generate and be more amenable to the siting of any new facilities
that are necessary, thereby reducing the need for new facilities but
ensuring that the ones needed will be built, the restricted market
should improve the lot of the lowest representative person regardless
of whether she resides in a net waste-importer state or a net wasteexporter state. If the welfare of the lowest representative person in
both waste-importing and waste-exporting states is thereby improved,
Rawls's difference principle would find the restricted market more
just than the unrestricted market. 42
4. Compensatory Justice
The above principles of justice were each applied to assess the
fairness to importing and exporting states of the physical distribution
of waste resulting from the national market and state access barriers.
Under the general conception of compensatory justice, however,
inequalities resulting from the physical distribution of waste can be

242. While it is true that the unrestricted market should also result in fewer disposal
facilities overall as a result of the regionalization of waste disposal, there is no guarantee
that all of the facilities that must be built will not be built in the net waste-importer states,
thereby failing to improve the welfare of the lowest representative of the waste-importer

state.
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eliminated through the payment of financial compensation or in-kind
benefits.243 Compensatory justice, a fundamental conception of
justice emphasized by Aristotle, 244 is institutionalized in all the
world's legal systems and forms the basis for private lawsuits. 245
It could be argued that the requirements of compensatory justice
are currently being met under free market conditions through the
increasingly common practice of private solid waste operators
disbursing "host fees" to communities that agree to the siting of a
disposal facility.2' Several states have incorporated mechanisms for
channeling compensation to host communities into their siting process
for solid waste facilities. 247

243. See JOEL FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING 93 (1970). He wrote that,
[t]he principle that unpleasant, onerous, and hazardous jobs deserve economic
compensation, unlike the claim that superior ability deserves economic reward,
is an equalitarian one, for it says only that deprivations for which there is no
good reason should be compensated to the point where the deprived one is again
brought back to a position of equality with his fellows.
Id.; see also WOJCIECH SADURSKI, GIVING DESERT ITS Do: SOCIAL JUSTICE AND LEGAL
THEORY 144 (1985) (maintaining that such compensation should be designed to rectify
"injustice resulting from a disequilibrium of benefits and burdens").
244. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 199, at 273-79 (describing the principle of corrective
justice).
245. See Richard Posner, The Concept of CorrectiveJustice in Recent Theories of Tort
Law, 10 J. LEG. STUD. 187 (1981); Ernest J. Weinrib, CorrectiveJustice, 77 IOWA L. REV.
403 (1992) (invoking Aristotle's conception of corrective justice to support a formalist
framework for private law); see also Anthony D'Amato & Kirsten Engel, State Responsibility for the Exportationof NuclearPower Technology, 74 VA. L. REV. 1011, 1047 (1988)
(pronouncing the pervasiveness of compensatory justice and its requirement that the
injuring person owes financial compensation to the injured party).
246. See supra note 125.
247. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-6-1504 (Michie 1993) (providing that compensation to
community may be used to rebut presumption against permitting or construction of a high
impact solid waste management facility within 12 miles of existing facility); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 22a-285g (1992) (authorizing municipal committee to negotiate with applicant for
municipal incinerator over compensation to be given community hosting ash disposal area
for adverse economic effects resulting from ash residue disposal area, noise, odors,
increased traffic, police and fire protection, site monitoring; compensation shall not be less
than $5 per ton of ash disposed); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 147A.031 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
1992) (providing that state agency shall develop procedures for resolving conflicts
associated with multijurisdictional municipal solid waste management facilities including
host community compensation); 1993 ME. LEGIS. SERV. § 310 (West) (authorizing host
municipality to negotiate benefits relating to siting of solid waste disposal facilities); WiS.
STAT. § 144.445 (1991-92) (providing for compensation to persons for certain economic
impacts from solid or hazardous waste facility subject to arbitration). Several states also
provide for compensation for the siting of hazardous waste disposal facilities. See, e.g.,
GA. CODE ANN § 12-8-39 (1992); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D, § 12 (West 1992);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3734.25 (Anderson 1992); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-19.7-7 (1989).
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There are several potential objections to the "host fee" concept,
some of which reject the notion that money can or should be used to
compensate for increased health risks. A moral objection to host fees
is the argument that compensation allows for the "commodification"
of health. Often communities offered compensation for the siting of
a waste disposal facility view the offers as bribes.2" Under this
objection, it is argued that, just as we do not allow persons to sell
limbs or kidneys, we should not allow them to risk their health for the
compensation offered by solid waste disposal companies. 49
Under a second objection, it is accepted that financial compensation can make up for increased health risks, but it is argued that the
target community's lack of information concerning the health risks
from waste disposal will result in agreements for compensation that
do not compensate the community for the full costs of waste
A third related
disposalff or the costs to future generations.
objection is that an agreement between the disposal facility and the
community is unlikely to cover the full costs of waste disposal.
Because host fees are merely agreements between the local com248. See Lawrence S. Bacow & James R. Milkey, Overcoming Local Opposition to
Hazardous Waste Facilities: The Massachusetts Approach, 6 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 265,
276-77 (1982) (noting that offers of compensation have occasionally increased opposition
to hazardous waste facilities when perceived of as a bribe); Edward Patrick Boyle, Note,
It's Not Easy Bein' Green: The Psychology of Racism, Environmental Discrimination,and
the Argument for Modernizing Equal ProtectionAnalysis, 46 VAND. L. REv. 937, 974-77
(1993) ("Communities with depressed economies are more easily persuaded to accept a
facility proposal that promises to provide badly needed employment and economic
development to the area"; this system is unfair because developer rarely informs
community of health risks from the facility); Rachel Godsil, Note, Remedying Environmental Racism, 90 MIcH. L. REv. 394, 408 (1991) ("[M]any ... activists ... reject the
incentives approach as extortion and compensation as 'blood money.' "); Naikang Tsao,
Note, Ameliorating Environmental Racism: A Citizens' Guide to Combatting the
DiscriminatorySiting of Toxic Waste Dumps, 67 N.Y.U. L REV. 366, 374 (1992) ("In the
context of hazardous waste dump sites, these government deals are particularly
objectionable because they are, in effect, trading economic benefits for the residents'
health and safety.").
249. See Been, supra note 189, at 1040-46; see also Abel, supra note 203, at 714-15
(arguing that the principle that risk of physical harm should be distributed equally is
supported by our refusal to allow individuals to sell body parts or their right to be
protected from bodily injury).
250. See Been, supra note 189; at 1041 ("One ground for concern [with compensation]
is that information imperfections often will prevent the neighborhood from accurately
assessing the losses it will suffer.").
251. See id. at 1041; Harold P. Green, Legal Aspects of IntergenerationalEquity Issues,
in EQUITY ISSUES IN RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT 190,191 (Roger E. Kasperson

ed., 1983) (arguing that because funds are not available to compensate future generation
for its losses, intergenerational equity issues where the present generation benefits at the
expense of the future generations pose the most difficult problems).
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munity and the waste operator, essentially for the purpose of
obtaining the locality's consent to the siting of the facility, they are
unlikely to cover the increased regulatory costs associated with the
disposal of additional volumes of waste from out-of-state.
If this discussion demonstrates that host fees are a potential,
though at present not fully reliable means of meeting the requirements of compensatory justice, it also demonstrates that the
alleged defects in the compensatory scheme can be cured without
abandoning the national market. For example, states can currently
deal with the problem of inequalities in bargaining power through
regulation of the negotiation process or review of the resulting
agreements. State authority to restrict the current national market is
thus unnecessary to address this objection. State authority to regulate
interstate commerce is relevant only to the third objection to host
fees-that they will not fully compensate communities for the
additional costs of waste disposal from waste generated out-of-state.
Congress, however, could authorize states to impose discriminatory
fees on out-of-state waste, thereby allowing states and communities
to be fully compensated for the volumes of waste they receive from
out-of-state.
Because compensation will be more readily available where waste
disposal companies make the largest profits, and the problems with
compensation can be addressed without curtailing the size of the
market, retention of the national market is probably more consistent
than a state import ban with the ideal of compensatory justice.
However, to the extent state restrictions are themselves ways of
channeling compensation to a community (surcharges, for example),
such restrictions would be consistent with the notion of compensatory
justice.
IV.

OPTIONS FOR CONGRESSIONAL ACrION AND

THEIR TRADE-OFFS

The above discussion described the values that are relevant to the
distribution of waste in a democratic society and, in the process,
analyzed how different distributive schemes either support or oppose
each value. These values include not only economic efficiency, the
value purported to be advanced by the Court's dormant commerce
clause jurisprudence, but also equity, environmental protection, and
state autonomy. The following section applies the conclusions
reached in the above analysis to demonstrate that each of the options
for congressional action (or inaction) currently dominating the
legislative agenda-doing nothing, authorizing state import bans,
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authorizing discriminatory surcharges, and authorizing flow control

laws-entails considerable trade-offs among the values discussed in
part III.2 This part thus completes this Article's primary objective:
to provide an understanding of the implications of the current options
for managing the distribution of the nation's solid waste.
A. Do Nothing: Retain the UnrestrictedNational Market
It is uncertain whether Congress will enact legislation modifying
the national market in solid waste disposal. Although Congress has
recently expressed interest in legislation authorizing state barriers to
the interstate waste trade, this interest is juxtaposed against a long
history of relative indifference. 23 Lack of action by Congress,
whether it be purposeful or merely the result of inertia, would mean
that waste will continue to be distributed according to a national free
market mechanism. This option would simply affirm the trade-offs
currently enforced by the Court under the dormant commerce clause.
To recap the above discussion, the unrestricted national market
252. The trade-offs discussed in the following sections are illustrated in Table 4 of the
Appendix.
253. Recently, several bills authorizing state restrictions upon the interstate waste trade
have made headway in Congress. In October of 1994, separate bills representing
somewhat different approaches passed the House and Senate. H.R. 4779, 103d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1994) (prohibiting a landfill or incinerator from receiving out-of-state waste for
disposal in the absence of an explicit written authorization from the affected local
government); S. 2345, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (authorizing state governors to cap the
disposal of out-of-state waste to 1993 levels and to phase in reductions in the permissible
amount of out-of-state waste disposed of within the state in addition to having the
authority to prohibit the disposal of out-of-state waste upon the request of an affected
local government). Prior to these two bills, one bill authorizing state waste import barriers
passed the Senate in 1992. S. 2877, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). This recent activity is
against a backdrop of legislative efforts that produced little action. The other interstate
waste trade bills are: S. 439, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (permitting governors to limit
disposal of out-of-state muicipal and industrial waste); S. 1873,103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1993)
(same); H.R. 1076, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (same); H.R. 2848, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993) (same); H.R. 963, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (same); H.R. 599, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1993) (authorizing interstate compacts); H.R. 1357, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994)
(authorizing flow control laws); H.R. 4643, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (same); S. 1634,
103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (same); S. 2227,103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (same); H.R. 4662,
103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (same); S. 2877,102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (authorizing state
import bans); H.R. 3865,102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1992) (same); S. 153,102d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1992) (authorizing states to regulate solid waste in interstate commerce, including
collecting fees); H.R. 2380, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1992) (authorizing discriminatory fees
upon out-of-state waste); S. 2384, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (prohibiting out-of-state
waste disposal without local government authorization); H.R. 4561, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1991) (authorizing state import bans); S. 1754, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1991) (same); S.
1585, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (authorizing interstate compacts); H.R. 2723, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (same).
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enshrines economic efficiency, but it could only be considered fair
under the theory of compensatory justice; indeed, it is fair under this
theory of justice only if the market generates sufficiently high "host
fees" to compensate communities hosting a disposal facility that
accepts out-of-state waste. Under the more egalitarian conceptions
of justice, however, in particular the benefit/burden concordance
version of Aristotle's equality principle and Rawls's difference
principle, the national market is a decidedly unfair means of
distributing waste. The unrestricted national market may be favored
under the pollution prevention approach to environmental protection
(because it is necessary for a viable market in recyclables), but it will
be disfavored by the traditional capacity-creation approach to
environmental protection, as well as by the approach that follows
from a more ethical outlook on humans' relationship with nature.
Finally, the national market in waste is antithetical to state autonomy.
B. Authorize State Waste Import Bans
The substantial growth in the number of net waste-importing
states means that federal legislation authorizing state barriers to
interstate commerce in waste is now politically viable. 4 Were
Congress to allow states to regulate interstate commerce in waste, the
most intrusive form of state regulation it could authorize would be
import bans on out-of-state waste. Judging from the number of bills
introduced in Congress proposing import bans,z5 this appears to be
the favored approach. 6 Congressional authorization of import bans

254. At the present time, the number of senators and representatives from net wasteimporting states exceed the number of senators and representatives from net wasteexporting states by 10 and one respectively. See MONITOR LEADERSHIP DIRECTORIES,
INC., 19 CONGRESSIONAL YELLOW BOOK (1994); Repa, supra note 36. It must be
recognized, however, that this tally makes political action on legislation authorizing state
waste barriers a realistic political option only if it is assumed that all congressional
representatives from net waste-importing states will favor such legislation and that the
congressional representatives from the 27 states that are neither net importers nor net
exporters will not oppose the legislation. Because there are benefits accompanying waste
disposal, it may not be accurate to assume that representatives from all net wasteimporting states will support such legislation. Also, this does not take into consideration
the influence of key congressional committee leaders or the outcome of any "logrolling"
or other vote-trading that may occur in the process of enacting legislation.
255. See supra note 253.
256. The only bill to pass either house of Congress, S. 2877, 102d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1992), authorized state governors to ban the importation of out-of-state waste if requested
to do so by local governments. The latest bill to emerge from the Senate, S. 2345, 103d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1993), softens the blow of the import ban approach to waste exporters by
lowering the amount by which a state may export waste over a several year period. For
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would legalize the New Jersey and Michigan laws struck down in
Philadelphia v. New Jersey and Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill on

dormant commerce clause grounds.
State import bans present trade-offs almost exactly opposite from
those presented by the unrestricted market. Although import bans
are fair according to the egalitarian principles of justice found in
Aristotle's

benefit/burden

concordance

principle

and

Rawls's

difference principle, they are decidedly inefficient. Of all the options
considered here, the state import ban option comes closest to
embodying the ethical perspective on the environment. 7 Furthermore, although import bans may suppress the NIMBY syndrome,
clearing the way for the siting of new facilities and thereby fulfilling
the traditional approach to environmental protection, because they
may block waste reduction efforts by constricting the market for
recycled materials, they wil not satisfy the requirements of the newer,
pollution-prevention approach to environmental protection. This
latter trade-off could be addressed by excepting recycled materials
from the authorization to impose import bans."8 Finally, because
import bans should better enable states to plan for their waste
disposal needs and eliminate the drain on state finances attributable
to out-of-state waste, they strongly favor state autonomy.
C. Authorize State DiscriminatorySurcharges

Yet a third option would be to allow states to impose one of two
types of discriminatory surcharges on out-of-state waste. Where a
surcharge is unrestricted, the amount is not limited to the additional
costs of disposing of out-of-state waste;' 9 authorization for such
instance, a governor may unilaterally ban out-of-state waste from any state exporting more
than 3.5 million tons in 1995, but in 1999 may ban waste from any state exporting more
than 1 million tons. S. 2345, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 4011(a)(3)(A) (1993).
257. Compensatory justice is not applicable when evaluating the import ban option
because there is nothing to compensate.
258. See, e.g., S. 2877, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(d)(4)(c) (1992) (exempting from its
authorization of state import bans "any metal, pipe, glass, plastic, paper, textile, or other
material that has been separated or otherwise diverted from municipal waste and has been
transported into the State for the purpose of recycling or reclamation").
259. Several bills introduced in Congress authorized states to impose surcharges upon
out-of-state waste and did not limit such fees to the recovery of additional costs expended
by the state for the disposal of out-of-state waste. See, e.g., H.R. 2380, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1991) (authorizing states to impose discriminatory surcharges upon the treatment
and disposal of out-of-state waste, but requiring that any fee collected be used for recycling
and waste management programs); H.R. 3865, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (authorizing
escalating schedule of discriminatory fees upon out-of-state waste tied to state's satisfaction
of solid waste management planning obligations).

1550

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73

surcharges would have legalized the higher fee charged by Alabama
for the disposal of hazardous waste generated out-of-state and struck
down on dormant commerce clause grounds in Chemical Waste
Management, Inc. v. Hunt.'
Depending on implementation,
unrestricted discriminatory surcharges could pose much the same
trade-offs as state access barriers. Because there is no ceiling on the
fee, a state can set a fee so high that it would effectively halt the flow
of out-of-state waste in the same manner as a waste import ban.
A compensatory surcharge merely compensates the state for the
additional, unrecovered costs associated with the disposal of out-ofstate waste. Congress's authorization of compensatory surcharges
would legalize the discriminatory fee struck down in Oregon Waste
Systems v. Department of Environmental Quality.261 Compensatory
surcharges represent something of a middle ground between the
trade-offs required under the unrestricted national market and those
accompanying import bans. By internalizing many of the externalities
attributable to disposing of out-of-state waste, a compensatory fee
renders the national market in waste truly efficient. Furthermore,
although they do not make it any easier for states to plan for future
capacity needs, because discriminatory surcharges eliminate the
additional financial burden of out-of-state waste, they modestly
further state autonomy. Finally, discriminatory surcharges fully satisfy
the criteria of compensatory justice.
D. Authorize State Flow Control Laws
A fourth type of state restriction is the flow control law.
Congressional authorization of state prohibitions on the disposal of
waste at other than locally designated facilities would legalize the flow
control law recently struck down in C & A Carbone v. Town of

260. 112 S. Ct. 2009,2017 (1992) (holding that the surcharge on out-of-state waste does
not survive the appropriate scrutiny applicable to discrimination against interstate
commerce).
261. 114 S. Ct. 1345, 1355 (1994). This is assuming that Oregon's fee was only
compensatory. The Court indicated that it was skeptical of whether or not the difference
between the fee charged in-state and out-of-state waste could be attributed entirely to the
costs of waste disposal paid by state residents through general tax revenues. Id. at 1353
("[Whether] intrastate commerce pays its share of the costs underlying the surcharge
through general taxation... is difficult to determine, as '[general] tax payments are...
[often] lost in the general revenues.' "). But see Interoffice Memorandum from Steve
Greenwood, Oregon Department of Environmental Quality, to Solid Waste Advisory
Committee (Oct. 10, 1990) (showing detailed analysis of the costs attributable to Oregon
as a result of accepting out-of-state waste for disposal).
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ClarkstownY2 Flow control laws present similar, though not
identical, trade-offs to those of import bans. Like import bans, flow
control laws would be condemned on efficiency grounds; they raise
the costs of waste disposal by prohibiting waste generated within a
state or locality from being disposed of at lower cost facilities outside
the state or locality. On the other hand, because flow control laws
enable localities to finance waste disposal facilities through buy-back
arrangements with the chosen disposal facility, they are strongly
favored by both the state autonomy criteria and traditional approaches to environmental protection. Finally, although flow control
laws can result in greater burdens for the enacting locality (through
higher costs of waste disposal and possibly higher health risks),
because these burdens are voluntarily undertaken by the locality itself,
equitable principles of distributive justice are inapplicable, at least
insofar as they are discussed in this Article.
V. PROPOSED SOLUTION: AUTHORIZATION OF REGIONAL
INTERSTATE COMPACTS

The above discussion demonstrates that both the national free
market and the regulatory approaches pursued by states present
significant trade-offs between competing values relevant to a fair,
efficient, and workable scheme for distributing the nation's total waste
burden. Accordingly, if Congress limits itself to these choices, to the
extent a congressional member's decisions are influenced by the
values inherent in the criteria discussed, which option he or she
chooses will be the result of the weight placed upon each of the
competing criteria as filtered through the political process of majority
rule.
A member of Congress who ranks economic efficiency
highest among the four criteria, for example, will cast her vote in a
manner designed to thwart proposals to allow states to control the
distribution of waste through import bans, flow control laws, or
discriminatory surcharges. A member of Congress who values either
state autonomy over efficiency or equity or egalitarian definitions of
justice over efficiency will cast her vote in a manner that supports
state restrictions.

262. 114 S. Ct. 1677, 1680 (1994).
263. See id. at 1680 (declaring that the purpose of flow control regulation was to finance
the construction of a waste transfer station, but because the regulation deprives
competitors of local market access, it violates the Commerce Clause).
264. For the influence of collective action problems upon political outcomes, see
MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECrIVE ACTION (1971).
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Rather than adopting any of the options discussed above,
Congress should enact a compromise solution modeled after its
legislation for the distribution of low-level radioactive waste.265 As
others have noted, the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of
1980 (LLRWPA)2" was a response to some of the same problems
that now afflict the disposal of solid waste and thus constitutes an
appropriate model for solid waste.267 If certain changes are made
to the low-level radioactive waste model, regional interstate compacts
can satisfy all the criteria discussed in part III at least partially, even
if not to the full extent possible.
Like the current solid waste situation in many regions of the
nation, prior to the passage of the LLRWPA, the nation faced an
imminent crisis of adequate disposal capacity for low-level radioactive
waste.2' Even more dramatically than in the solid waste situation,
only disposal facilities in a few states accepted low-level waste from
all fifty states prior to LLRWPA's passage.269 Finally, as with the
economics of solid waste disposal, it was not deemed economically
efficient for states to be completely self-sufficient in the disposal of
In addressing the problems presented
low-level radioactive waste.'
by the disposal of low-level waste, therefore, Congress confronted the
same problems of equity and lack of capacity resulting from the
national free market disposal of waste, as well as the problem of

265. Low-level radioactive wastes are those generated by commercial nuclear power
plants, research institutions, and hospitals. ENGLISH, supra note 234, at 2-3.
266. Pub. L. No. 96-573, 94 Stat. 3347 (1980) (codified in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.), amended by Pub. L. No. 99-240,99 Stat. 1842 (1985) (codified in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.).
267. ENGLISH, supra note 234, at xii ("Low-level waste disposal is in some respects a
harbinger of things to come for hazardous and solid waste disposal, which have already
posed their own intractable difficulties."). For a detailed analysis of the political
environment that gave birth to the LLRWPA as well as the success and failures of the
regional compact approach, see ScoTr SALESKA, PUBLIC CITIZEN CRITICAL MASS
ENERGY PROJECT, NUCLEAR LEGACY VII-15 to -22 (1989).
268. In 1980, the year Congress passed the LLRWPA, only three disposal facilities
existed in the United States that could dispose of low-level radioactive waste. See Dan M.
Berkovitz, Waste Wars: Did Congress "Nuke" State Sovereignty in the Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985?, 11 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 441-43
(1987); ENGLISH, supra note 234, at 6-7. Furthermore, temporary closures and safety
problems at the Nevada and Washington sites in 1979 threatened to leave all states reliant
upon a single disposal site in South Carolina. ENGLISH, supra note 234, at 6.
269. Prior to the Act's passage, only three states with low-level radioactive waste
disposal facilities-Washington, South Carolina, and Nevada-accepted the low-level
radioactive wastes generated in all 50 states. Berkovitz, supra note 268, at 441-42.
270. See ENGLISH, supra note 234, at 1.
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inefficiency in waste disposal, that would occur if the national market

in solid waste were simply abandoned.
Congress's solution to this trade-off was to require state

responsibility for the disposal of low-level waste generated within the
state's territory,271 and encourage the formation of regional
interstate compacts that would be jointly responsible for the disposal
of waste within their multi-state regions. 2 72 Congress expressly
noted that low-level radioactive waste is most safely and efficiently
disposed of on a regional basis.'
Upon congressional ratification
of a compact, the LLRWPA provided that compact states could

exclude low-level waste generated in states that are not members of
the compact.2 74 States are not required to join regional compacts,
but states that fail to do so are not expressly authorized to exclude
out-of-state low-level waste, and 1985 amendments to the LLRWPA
and its legislative history suggest that Congress did not intend an
implicit authorization 5 Consequently, any attempt by a state not

271. 94 Stat. 3347, 3348 (1980) ("It is the policy of the Federal Government that (A)
[Each state is responsible for providing ... either within or without the State for the
dispersal of low-level radioactive waste generated within its borders.").
272. The Constitution permits states to form compacts to solve common problems. U.S.
CONST. art I, § 10, cl. 3. First used primarily to settle interstate boundary disputes,
interstate compacts have also been used to create interstate commissions to control
navigation on common waterways; provide for allocation of a common river for irrigation
purposes; give penal authority to adjacent states to seal loopholes for criminal defendants;
resolve the responsibility for state debt; conserve natural resources, such as fisheries, whose
habitats span two states; and prevent multiple state taxation of property. See FREDERICK
L. ZIMMERMAN & MrrCHELL WENDELL, THE INTERSTATE COMPACT SINCE 1925 3-29
(1951); Felix Frankfurter & James Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution-A
Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE L.J. 685, 696-708 (1925); Note, Congressional
Supervision of Interstate Compacts, 75 YALE LJ. 1416, 1422-29 (1966). The Constitution
expressly conditions the authority to enter into compacts on the consent of Congress,
although at one time the Court implied that compacts not encroaching upon federal power
need not obtain congressional consent. Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503,517-18 (1893).
Congress has also consented in advance to the formation of compacts. See, e.g., Weeks
Act of 1911,16 U.S.C. § 552 (1988) (authorizing in advance state compacts for the purpose
of protecting forests); see also ZIMMERMAN & WENDELL, supra, at 58-71 (describing
federal participationin the compacting process).
273. See § 4, 94. Stat. at 3348; see also ENGLISH, supra note 234, at 1 (arguing that
LLRWPA constituted a compromise between the competing values of equity and
efficiency).
274. Congress required that each compact contain a provision allowing Congress an
opportunity to withdraw its consent every five years after the compact has taken effect.
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2021d(d) (West Supp. 1994).
275. Although the 1980 Act did not define a "compact," the 1985 Amendments
specifically added a definition of "compact," stating that the term "means a compact
entered into by two or more States." 42 U.S.C. § 2021b(4) (1988). Under both the 1980
Act and the 1985 amendments, only states in "compacts" are authorized to exclude low-
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a member of a compact to exclude out-of-state waste would be invalid
under the dormant commerce clause.
When Congress amended the LLRWPA in 1985, it inserted a
series of financial and access incentives for nonsited states keyed to
their compliance with milestones in the development of new low-level
waste disposal capacity. 6 Although six compacts had been ratified,
the new compacts' failures actually to site new low-level disposal
capacity made these measures necessary. m Congress authorized
generators to continue disposing of their low-level waste at facilities
in states outside their regional compact, but allowed sited states to
impose surcharges and access restrictions on out-of-state waste that
became progressively more stringent with the passage of time. 27
The surcharges included both compensatory surcharges, which the
host state could retain to pay for regulatory and other costs attributed
to low-level waste disposal, and penalty surcharges, which were to be
rebated to the state or compact region for the development of new
facilities if the originating state succeeded in meeting its deadlines, or
retained by the Department of Energy if it did not.29 Upon the
expiration of this first set of deadlines, sited states were authorized to
ban the disposal of waste generated in noncomplying states.2 Prior
to the provision's being struck down on Tenth Amendment grounds
in New York v. United States,"' the LLRWPA also required that
noncomplying states take title to and possession of all low-level
radioactive wastes generated within their borders.' At present, the
LLRWPA has generated ten interstate compacts (nine of which have
received Congress's consent), including all but ten states and territories.

level waste generated in states outside the region. See 94 Stat. 3348 (1980); 42 U.S.C.§
2021e (1988); see also H.R. REP. 314(I), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1985), reprintedin 1985
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2975, 2985 (stating that states that do not join regional compacts are not
considered to be a "compact" under proposed amendments to the 1980 Act or under the
1980 Act itself).
276. 42 U.S.C. § 2021e (1988).
277. H.R. REP. 314(I), 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 13-15 (1985), reprinted in 1985
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2975, 2976-78.
278. 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(1) (1988).

279. Id. § 2021e(d).
280. Id. § 2021e(e)(2)(B) (allowing regional disposal facilities to deny access to waste
generated by noncompact regions or non-member states if they are 12 months late in
complying with a particular deadline).

281. 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
282. New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. at 2416.
283. FourLow-Level Waste Sites Selected By Regional Compacts Could Open by 1998,
25 Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 1832 (1995). The ten unaffiliated states and territories are: New
York, Texas, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island,
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Congress need not precisely duplicate the LLRWPA, but should
adopt legislation similar to this Act to govern state responsibility for
the disposal of municipal solid waste.
Under such legislation,
Congress could expressly authorize states that enter into regional state
compacts to prohibit the disposal of solid waste generated in nonmember states. In order to give states time to form compacts and
create the disposal capacity necessary to achieve compact selfsufficiency in waste disposal, Congress could duplicate the approach
adopted by the LLRWPA of 1985 and allow states accepting out-ofstate waste to charge graduated surcharges over a several-year period,
at the end of which the states would be permitted to ban the
importation of solid waste generated outside the region.
Depending upon its implementation by the states, the regional
interstate compact approach has the potential to satisfy, at least
partially, all of the relevant criteria for congressional consideration
outlined in part III. Regional compacts thus present a viable solution
for those uncomfortable with the extreme trade-offs resulting from
either retaining the national market or authorizing state restrictions
such as import bans. Regional compacts may also present a viable
political compromise if Congress finds itself split between proposals
to retain or alter the status quo.
Although regional compacts do not maximize efficiency, they
retain efficiency as a value in the disposal of waste. While restricting
disposal of solid waste to state-sized markets is arguably inefficient,
markets that are the size of two or more states should be sufficiently
large to allow for the construction of facilities large enough to
capitalize on economies of scale. Regional waste disposal has the
further advantage of retaining the natural interstate "wastesheds" that
have developed under the unrestricted national market.
The

Vermont, the District of Columbia, and Maine. Id. at 1833. Congress did something
similar to the LLRWPA, though not quite as sweeping (or draconian), with respect to
interstate commerce in hazardous waste. Under the 1986 Amendments to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), states are
required to demonstrate that they, or a state with which they have an interstate agreement,
have sufficient capacity for the disposal of all hazardous waste expected to be generated
within the state during the next 20 years. 42 U.S.C. §9604(c)(9) (1988). As a penalty for
failure to provide such assurance, Congress directed that no Superfund cleanup action take

place in noncomplying states. Id.
284. At least three of the bills introduced so far in Congress would have authorized
states to enter regional interstate compacts for the disposal of solid waste and allowed such
compacts to exclude waste generated in unaffiliated states. See H.R. 599, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1993); S. 1585, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); H.R. 2723, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
285. See supra note 53.
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regional compact approach also satisfies, at least to some degree, each
of the definitions of distributive justice discussed in part III.
Assuming that the prospect of excluding waste generated outside the
compact region makes it easier to site new disposal facilities by stifling
the NIMBY syndrome somewhat, regional compacts will satisfy
Rawls's difference principle. Consequently, even if a compact decides
to site just one new facility and the state in which the representative
lowest person resides is chosen as the facility's host, this person will
still be better off under the interstate compact approach than he was
under the unrestricted national market. The regional compact
approach arguably meets both versions of Aristotle's equality
principle. The region's total waste disposal burden will be proportionate to the region's total waste disposal benefits. Consequently, the
regional compact approach satisfies the benefit/burden concordance
principle at the regional level, rather than at the state level.
Furthermore, the compact approach comes closer than any of the
options discussed in part IV to meeting the burden/benefit equalization principle for two reasons. First, the demographic and other
characteristics that affect the magnitude of the burden of waste
disposal tend not to vary significantly between states in a given
region. 6 Second, states within compacts can agree to take turns
hosting disposal facilities' or agree to some arrangement whereby
each state hosts the same number of facilities as each of the other
compact states. Because the burden of waste disposal is substantially
similar among all compact states and all states receive equal shares of
the total waste burden of all compact states combined, under either
arrangement the distribution of waste within a compact area should
approximate the benefit/burden equalization demanded by the second
version of Aristotle's equality principle.'

286. See infraAppendix, Table 3 (noting rough similarities between population densities
of northeastern states, east north central states, west north central states, east south central
states, west south central states, and western states).
287. At least one of the compacts established pursuant to the LLRWPA provides that
state members shall take turns hosting a regional facility. See Omnibus Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Interstate Compact Consent Act, Pub. L. No. 99-240, 99 Stat. 1859,
1877 (1985) ("Any party state which becomes a host state in which a regional facility is
operated shall not be designated by the Compact Commission as a host state for an
additional regional facility until each party state has fulfilled its obligation.., to have a
regional facility operated within its borders.").
288. Compacts themselves would differ in the total amount of waste that would be
distributed for disposal among their member states. Benefit/burden equalization would
not be satisfied, therefore, on an intercompact level. This criticism of the compact
approach is discussed infra note 297 and accompanying text.
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When states dispose of waste generated either in other compact
states or, during the transition period, in unaffiliated states, the
dictates of compensatory justice can also be satisfied by the requirements applicable to regional compacts. First, Congress could
require that states currently accepting out-of-state waste receive a
compensatory surcharge while compact sites must still accept waste
generated in unaffiliated states. Second, states entering into solid
waste disposal compacts could duplicate the approach of several of
the low-level waste compacts in allowing the compact state or states
that receive waste from other compact states to charge a compensatory fee to cover the additional costs to the state from hosting the
facility.m 9
The regional interstate compact approach arguably satisfies all
approaches to environmental protection. Because of the large size of
the potential market for recycled materials afforded by a regional
interstate compact, the compact approach should satisfy the pollution
prevention approach to environmental protection. Furthermore,
because the regional compact approach is consistent with the concept
of economically self-sufficient bioregions that span distinct ecosystems
within the United States-an idea widely discussed in environmental
ethics literature 2R--the compact option arguably furthers the agenda
of environmental ethics.
Assuming that the siting of new facilities will be made easier as
a result of compacts' ability to exclude waste generated in unaffiliated
states, regional compacts are in accord with the traditional approach
to environmental protection. It should be noted that the experience
under the LLRWPA does not necessarily support such predictions.
ALthough four low-level waste sites were recently selected, the siting
process was an extremely lengthy and drawn-out process.291 It is not

289. See Omnibus Low-Level Radioactive Waste Interstate Compact Consent Act, Pub.
L. No. 99-240, 99 Stat. 1859, 1877 (1985) (allowing host state to impose additional fees
upon users of the regional disposal facilities located within their state which "shall provide
the host state with sufficient revenue to cover any costs associated with such facilities").
290. See e.g., Kirkpatrick Sale, Bioregionalism-A New Way to Treat the Land, 14

ECOLOGIST 165, 167 (1984) (the economy sustained by a bioregion is based "on the most
elemental and most elegant principle of the natural world, that of self-sufficiency"); Peter
Berg, What is Bioregionalism?,8 THE TRUMPETER 3. OF ECOSOPHY 6,6 (1991) (describing

bioregionalism as encompassing "living-in-place" which is defined as "following the
necessities and pleasures of life as they are uniquely presented by a particular site, and
evolving ways to ensure long term occupancy of that site.").
291. Telephone Interview with Terry Plummer, National Low-Level Waste Program,
United States Department of Energy (Sept. 9, 1994). Four states and regional compacts
recently announced the siting of four separate low-level waste disposal facilities. Four
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clear that the experience with low-level waste is necessarily a good
indication of what will happen if the compact approach is adopted for
solid waste, however. For low-level waste, no more than one facility
need be sited for all states within a compact, and that one facility may
satisfy the compact area's disposal needs for several decades."w
Consequently, the stakes over which state will be the first to host a
low-level disposal facility are extremely high. This has bogged down
negotiations between states and made it difficult for the chosen host
state to obtain the agreement of a community within the state to
locate a facility.2" Solid waste, in contrast, is generated in far larger
quantities and thus will necessitate the siting of more than one facility
per compact. This should mean that negotiations between states in
solid waste compacts will not carry such high stakes. Furthermore,
solid waste is less hazardous than highly radioactive low-level
waste2 94 On the basis of potential health harm, therefore, community resistance to the siting of a solid waste disposal facility should
be less intense.
Finally, although states would have less autonomy over waste
disposal within their states under the regional compact option than
they would if Congress authorized state import or export bans, they
would have significantly more autonomy than they presently have
under the unrestricted national market.2 s By joining a regional
compact, states obviously surrender a good degree of autonomy.
They surrender autonomy both to the other states within their
compact as well as to Congress, since compacts require congressional
ratification. Nevertheless, states do retain the power to choose
whether to join a compact in the first place.296 If Congress essentially duplicates its approach under the LLRWPA, states would not be
required to join regional compacts, but could continue to handle their

Low-Level Waste Sites Selected By Regional CompactsCould Open By 1998,25 Envtl. Rep.
(BNA) 1832 (1995). The four state or regional compacts are the Southeast Compact, the
Southeastern Compact, the Central Compact, and Texas. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id.; see also ENGLISH, supra note 234, at 118-27 (noting that Southeast Compact
had trouble selecting a host state and then that the chosen host state, North Carolina, had
trouble finding a locality that would agree to site a low-level waste disposal facility).
294. See ENGLISH, supra note 234, at 2-3 (discussing safety and disposal requirements
for low-level radioactive wastes).
295. The regional compact approach adopted in the LLRWPA was actually suggested
to Congress by the National Governors' Association. SALEsKA, supranote 267, at VII-15.
296. It is doubtful that Congress could require states to join regional compacts. Such
a requirement would appear to regulate "states as states" and thus violate the Tenth
Amendment. New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2429 (1992).
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waste as they have been doing under the national free market. In
order to preserve the incentive for states to join compacts, Congress
would likely not allow states who fail to join compacts to exclude outIf states join compacts, their autonomy is
of-state waste.
compromised, though not extinguished. States preserve a measure of
control over waste disposal within their state through their ability to
negotiate with other states over the compact legislation and the
procedures for choosing host states for the region's solid waste
disposal facilities. Thus, while not gaining physical control over waste
volumes disposed of within their territories, states do at least gain
some measure of procedural control over how that volume is decided.
Furthermore, the regional compact approach can alleviate some of the
problems states have with the national free market, such as the
inability to plan for future waste disposal capacity and the inability to
charge the discriminatory fees necessary to ensure that the general tax
revenues used to fund waste disposal are fully refunded.
Several objections to the interstate compact approach merit
discussion. The first might be one of equity. Arguably, regional
compacts merely duplicate the inequities that would result were each
state allowed to enact an import ban, only the inequities now exist on
a regional, rather than a state, level. A northeastern state will still
have a higher waste disposal burden than a western state, for
example, regardless of whether it is in a compact, since its co-compact
members will all be states with high population and waste densities.
This inequity could be mitigated by allowing states to enter into
compacts with states outside their geographic region, such as a
compact between New York, New Jersey, New Mexico, and Utah.
One low-level radioactive waste compact is decidedly unregional.
Known as the Texas Compact, this compact includes Texas, Maine,
While this would seem to eliminate the
Vermont, and Utah.2
criticism that compacts mirror the inequities of the current
distribution of waste, it may reduce the degree to which the compact
approach satisfies some of the criteria values. For example, nonregional compacts will be less efficient than regional compacts because
waste must be hauled longer distances. Furthermore, nonregional
297. LOW-LEVEL RADIoACfTVE WASTE FORUM, supra note 283, at 14-15. Texas has
agreed to be the host state for the Texas Compact. The Texas Compact is the one
compact still awaiting congressional consent. Id. Nothing in the LLRWPA bars states in
different regions from joining together in a compact. Thus, when Congress debates the
ratification of the Texas Compact, it will have to decide whether compacts composed of
states from different regions are consistent with the efficiency purposes underlying the
interstate compact approach.
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compacts may be considered contrary to the ethical approach toward
the environment because persons are unlikely to feel as great a
responsibility toward the health of more distant ecosystems.
Nevertheless, the nonregional compact option promotes some equity
advantages, and should be included as an option on at least an
experimental basis.
A second objection might be that regional interstate compacts do
nothing to reduce the total volume of waste produced and thus are
unsatisfactory from the perspective of pollution prevention even if
they do facilitate market-based approaches toward the disposal of
recycled materials. While the regional interstate compact approach
does nothing to reduce waste generation-other than retaining the
national market conditions thought to be important to a viable market
in recycled materials-neither does any of the other options currently
before Congress for controlling the distribution of waste. To meet
this objection, Congress could impose certain conditions upon
ratification of interstate compacts in order to give greater incentives
to states to implement waste reduction initiatives. For example,
Congress could refuse to ratify compacts that did not provide for the
reduction of waste in compact states by twenty-five percent or
withdraw its consent from compacts that failed to meet their waste
reduction goals.
VI. CONCLUSION

Data compiled in this Article demonstrates that the current
national market mechanism for distributing solid waste results in some
states, mostly rural and poorer ones, becoming net waste importers
and other states, mostly those that are urban and wealthier, becoming
net waste exporters. Congress has the authority to reverse this trend
through the exercise of its affirmative power under the Commerce
Clause. If Congress decides to limit its choices to retaining the
national market or authorizing states to impose the restrictions they
are currently barred from passing under the dormant commerce
clause-import bans, flow control laws, and discriminatory surcharges-any action Congress takes (or does not take) will involve
significant trade-offs between the competing values of economic
efficiency, equity, environmental protection, and state autonomy. As
might be expected, the largest trade-off is that between economic
efficiency on the one hand and state autonomy and equity on the
other.
Congress can avoid these extreme trade-offs, and perhaps a
political stalemate as well, by adopting a compromise solution
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authorizing the formation of regional interstate compacts. Such
compacts would be responsible for the disposal of solid waste within
a multistate alliance and would have the authority to exclude waste
generated outside the alliance. While not dispensing with the
efficiency of the national market, the interstate compact option
recognizes a democratic society's need to satisfy the competing values
of equity, environmental protection, and state autonomy when
constructing a fair and workable scheme to distribute the disposal
burdens of the nation's solid waste.
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APPENDiX

TABLE 1
AVERAoE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN WASTE IMPORTERS AND
EXPORTERS (BASED ON ANALYSIS OF 114 IMPORTER - EXPORTER
PAIRS OF STATES)*

$tatistic
Population Density (persons per
square mile)**
Municipal Solid Waste Density (tons
per square mile)***
Municipal Solid Waster Per Capita
(tons per year)***
Percentage Minority Population
(Black and Hispanic) (%)**
Per Capita Income ($ per year)**
Percentage Below Poverty Level
(%)**
Air Pollution (TRI Data) (million
pounds per year)****
Water Pollution (TRI Data) (million
pounds per year)****

Percentage of
Importers
with More of
the Statistic

Average Difference
(95% Confidence Interval)
(importers minus exporters)
-173.25

(-231.66

-114.84)

34

-49.22

(-80.21

-18.22)

46

.14

(.11

.18)

80

-3.08
$-1,171.20

-4.89
($-1,682.91

-1.18)
$-659.12)

36
31

.69

(.08

1.46)

53

13.08

(3.95

2222)

65

2.65

(-.13

5.43)

63

The data in this Table were complied from a comparison of the top 10 net waste importing
states and the top 10 net waste exporting states and their waste trade partner states (not
including Washington, D.C.). This Table shows the average difference between importers
and exporters with respect to each of the demographic and other statistics listed in the far
left column. The average differences were derived by subtracting the statistic
corresponding to the exporting state from that corresponding to the importing state for
each of the 114 combinations of importer-exporter partners and then performing a t-test
on this difference to determine 95% confidence intervals.
** U.S. DEP'T. OF COiiMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 1993 29, 30, 217, 468, 471 (13th ed. 1993) (giving the following information
by state: population per square mile, land area, total resident population, resident
population by race, income per capita, percent of resident population with incomes below
the poverty level)..
* Data are currently unavailable on the exact volumes of waste disposed of in each state.
Consequently, the municipal solid waste density for each state was calculated by
multiplying the state's population by 0.73 tons (the estimated amount of waste generated
per person per year), subtracting or adding the amount of a state's net waste imports or net
exports and dividing the resulting number of the state's land area. The municipal solid
waste per capita for each state was calculated by multiplying the state's population by 0.73
tons per year, subtracting or adding the state's net waste imports or exports and dividing
the resulting number by the state's population. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, CHARACTERIZATION OF MUNICIPAL SouD WASTE IN THE UNrTED STATES: 1990
UPDATE (1990) (estimating that the average of municipal solid waste generated daily per
person in the United States in 1990 is 4.0 lbs.); Edward Repa, InterstateMovement of Solid
Waste - 1992 Update, WAST AGE MAOAZINE (Special Report: 1993) (net imports and
exports of municipal solid waste in millions of tons by state).
*

*

U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, 1991 TOXIC RELEASE INVENTORY (1991)

(total amount of specified toxic chemical releases to air and water by state in pounds
during 1991).
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TABLE 2*
10 NET EXPORTER AND NET IMPORTER STATES

AND THEI

STATE TRADING PARTNERS
Net Exporter
1. New York
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

1.

New Jersey
Missouri
Washington
District of Columbia
Rhode Island
Texas
Michigan
Massachusetts
Idaho

Net Exports
(mill. of tons)

Importer Partners

3.7

Cr', DE, FL, GA, IL, IN, KY, ME, MD, MA, MI,
MO, OH, PA; VT, VA, WV
DE, IL, IN, KY, MD, Ml, NY, OH, PA, VA, WV
AR, IL, 10, KA, KY, TN
OR
MD, OH, PA, VA
Cr, ME, MA, NH, OH
AR, LA, NM, OK
IL, IN, OH, WI
CT, DE, IL, IN, ME, NH, NY, OH, RI
MT, UT, WA

2.6
1.1
0.6
0.6
0.5
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1

Net Importer

Net Imports
(mill. of tons)

Pennsylvania

Exporter Partners

3.3

CT, DE, DC, MD, NJ, NY, OH, ON, VA, WV

2. Illinois

1.8

3. Ohio

1.5

AR, CT, FL, IN, 10, KY, MD, MA, MI, MN,
MO, NJ, NY, OH, PA, TN, VA, WI
CA, Cr, DE, DC, IL, IN, KY, ME, MD, MA,
MI, MN, NH, NJ, NY, ONT, PA, RI, TN, VA,
WV, WI
CT, IL, KY, MA, Mi, NJ, NY, OH, ONT, PA
DC, MD, NJ, NY, PA
KY, NJ, NY, OH, PA
AK, NV, WA
OK, MO
ME, MA, RI, VT
IL, IN, 10, KA, KY, MD, MI, MN

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Indiana
Virginia
West Virginia
Oregon
Kansas
New Hampshire
Wisconsin

1.4
1.4
0.8
0.6
0.5
0.3
0.3

* Edward Repa, Interstate Movement of Solid Waste 1992 Update, WASTE AGE MAO. (Special

Report: 1993).

[Vol. 73

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

1564

[-4~~~

0

00

L0

.4

T

l;

in~~S..SJ8~8.

888~~

P
dd oo

d

o;

8888
g8

888
14

88

d

d

d

d

00

d

V00s

s

o8

888:8

iWliTl

00

d

llllll

......................

8888888884,

gd

1995]

1565

MUNICIPAL WASTE APPENDIX

I

J-

I

~'00
2

~

eq

.

2

0

4

322 a
V.;

1

I1

le

a

0

0

J-j

04

11

z0C

I)'I

-4%

'0

A23--.

c~r~c.,

2821280
oo~

U.

I',

c.o

csrcc

FS

c-c;cc

-

0,

cl

88§21

00

cid

1-4"

i

~

.

~

.

-5
cq

'c

8888
V

88888888

88
al

1566

[Vol. 73

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

*

0 0

0

0

-1

0

0

z

z

*

0

0

0

z
R

*Z4

0

z"

00

..

0

z z

0Z5

csz

.0
ww

c- c

c-z

.z

c

0

.o
t ..
0
13
C ).J

c

~

0

